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Crafting a Model State Law for
Today’s Beer Industry
Brian D. Anhalt*
INTRODUCTION

Archaeologist Patrick McGovern hypothesizes that alcohol
started the “engine of society,” 1 but today’s state laws are causing
this engine to run rough. 2 As history reflects, beer quickly took
hold as an important part of American culture: Thomas Jefferson
was a homebrewer, the Continental Congress provided a daily
ration of beer to soldiers in the American Revolutionary War, and
the Mayflower landed in Massachusetts, rather than the Hudson
River area, in part because of a shrinking supply of beer.3 The
beer market has grown to a $100 billion business, and its

* Senior Managing Editor, Michigan State Law Review; Candidate for
Juris Doctor, Michigan State University College of Law, 2016; B.A., St.
Norbert College, 2013. The author would like to thank Professor Glen
Staszewski for his time and guidance throughout the Comment-writing
process and law school in general. The author also wishes to thank the
members of the Rogers Williams University Law Review for their efforts in
getting this Comment ready for publication. Lastly, the author expresses his
gratitude to his family for their continued encouragement and support.
1. Michael Kan, Did a Thirst for Beer Spark Civilization?,
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/history/
did-a-thirst-for-beer-spark-civilization-1869187.html.
2. See Ben Bullard, Craft Brewers Challenge Texas Law over
Distribution Rights, PERS. LIBERTY (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.personal
liberty.com/craft-brewers-challenge-texas-law-distribution-rights.
3. See AMY MITTELMAN, BREWING BATTLES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
BEER 6–22 (2008); see also Kenneth G. Elzinga, Beer, in THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 85, 85 (Walters Adams & James W. Brock eds., 10th ed.
2001).
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prominence has spurred regulation.4 Current regulations in
many states are outdated, and thus stifle competition and reduce
the variety of beer available for consumers. 5
The modern three-tier structure of American beer regulations
separates breweries, distributors, and retailers into three distinct
tiers.6 Breweries may sell only to distributors, distributors to
retailers, and retailers to consumers. 7
To regulate the
relationships between the three tiers, states have enacted beer
franchise laws, 8 limits on self-distribution to retailers,9 and limits
on selling directly to consumers. 10 Before states enacted beer
franchise laws, a small number of large breweries dominated the
market, holding a natural bargaining advantage over a large
number of small distributors. 11 Beer franchise laws attempted to
4. National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N, https://
www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/national-beer-sales-production-data
(last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (valuating the “overall beer market” in 2014 at
$101.5 billion); see Elzinga, supra note 3, at 85.
5. See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 2.
6. Barry Kurtz & Bryan H. Clements, Beer Distribution Law as
Compared to Traditional Franchise Law, 33 FRANCHISE L.J. 397, 400 (2014);
Gregory E. Durkin, Note, What Does Granholm v. Heald Mean for the Future
of the Twenty-First Amendment, the Three-Tier System, and Efficient Alcohol
Distribution?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2006).
7. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 400; Durkin, supra note 6, at
1097.
8. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-31(b)(3) (2014); ME. STAT. tit. 28, §
1407 (2014); see also Andrew Tamayo, Comment, What’s Brewing in the Old
North State: An Analysis of the Beer Distribution Laws Regulating North
Carolina’s Craft Breweries, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2198, 2213 (2010).
9. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-940(A) (2014) (“A manufacturer or
brewer of beer, ale, porter, or other malt beverages or a person who imports
these products produced outside the United States must not sell, barter,
exchange, transfer, or deliver for resale beer to a person not having a
wholesale permit.”); see also Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231–35. Selfdistribution limits restrict a brewery’s ability to directly distribute to
retailers, preventing breweries from bypassing the second-tier distributors.
See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231–35.
10. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-230 (2015) (“[A]ll beer that is to be
distributed in Montana . . . must be . . . shipped, either directly or via a
licensed storage depot, to a licensed wholesaler.”); see also Shirley Chen,
Student Article, Craft Beer Drinkers Reignite the Wine Wars, 26 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 526, 527 (2014) (comparing the constitutional limits on
direct shipping for wine sellers with direct-sale limits for breweries).
11. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2213. Direct-sale limits restrict a
brewery’s ability to sell beer directly to consumers. See, e.g., MONT. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-213 (“Except as provided for small breweries . . . it is unlawful for
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correct this bargaining differential by requiring the inclusion of
statutorily mandated distributor protections in franchise
agreements.12 These laws reflected the market conditions at the
time of their enactment. 13
Subsequent to states enacting these protections, the dynamic
of the beer industry changed, but the regulations remained the
same.14 The rising popularity of craft beer led to an expansion in
the number of small breweries. 15 As small breweries grew in
number, other factors led to a consolidation of market power in
the distribution market, causing most breweries to lose their
bargaining advantage in franchise negotiations. 16 Despite the
shift of market power in favor of distributors, many states left the
mandated protections for distributors in place. 17 Consequently,
these market changes left beer-industry laws outdated and illequipped for the current market environment, disadvantaging
craft breweries bargaining for franchise agreements with
distributors. 18
In addition to disadvantaging breweries in franchise
negotiations, the current laws regulating distribution often inhibit
any brewer or breweries or beer importer to have or own any permit to sell or
retail beer at any place or premises. It is the intention of this section to
prohibit brewers and beer importers from engaging in the retail sale of
beer.”).
12. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07; Tamayo, supra note 8, at
2213 (“This protection of distributors was seen as necessary to further ‘the
goal of fragmented, weak players that [are] unable to wield political and
marketing power’ and, in turn, to maintain the vitality of the three tier
system.” (alteration in original) (quoting Evan T. Lawson, The Future of the
Three-Tiered System as a Control of Marketing Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL: THE 21ST AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 31, 33 (Carole J. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008))).
13. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2202 (noting that the laws were
enacted in response to the concentration of market power in large breweries
and their bargaining advantage over distributors).
14. Id. (stating that since the enactment of the beer franchise laws, the
beer industry has significantly changed, but distributors have resisted
changes to the law).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 2231–32.
18. Id. at 2218 (“As distributors have moved from small family-owned
operations to much larger corporations, many small brewers question the
rationale for the laws when the distributors have more bargaining power
than they do.”).
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new and small breweries’ abilities to reach new markets by
limiting the opportunity to self-distribute to retailers and directly
sell to consumers.19 New and small breweries often struggle to
form distribution agreements: they have not yet built retailer and
consumer bases, and so their brands lack value and require
significant investment by a distributor. 20 At the same time, state
laws prevent breweries from directly selling to consumers and
self-distributing to retailers to build those bases to lessen the need
for distributor investment. 21 If a distributor will not distribute
the beer, and if the brewery cannot directly sell its beer to
consumers or self-distribute to retailers, then the brewery cannot
reach new markets. 22
To improve competition in the market and to promote the
variety that today’s consumers demand, modifications must be
made to beer franchise laws, self-distribution laws, and direct-sale
laws in order to equalize the bargaining relationship. While
states should maintain the three-tier system to prevent abuses by
large breweries, they should exempt small breweries, and allow
small breweries to self-distribute and sell directly to consumers.
States should also exempt small breweries from the beer franchise
laws. These proposals reflect the realities of the modern beer
market and promote competition and variety.
Part I of this Comment discusses the craft beer revolution and
its impact on the current beer market with the significant increase
in the number of breweries. Part II summarizes the development
of modern beer regulations in America, including the three-tier
system, beer franchise laws, self-distribution laws, and direct-sale
laws. Part III proposes a model law to remedy the problems
caused by the current regulations, including exemptions for small
breweries.23 These solutions would meet consumers’ demands
and create an economically healthy beer market.

19. See id. at 2231–35.
20. See id. at 2233–35.
21. See id.
22. See Chen, supra note 10, at 541 (explaining that craft breweries may
be unable to continue their business if they experience difficulty in “not
be[ing] picked up by” distributors and being unable to sell directly to
consumers).
23. The full text of the author’s proposed model law is contained in an
Appendix. See infra pp. 213–14
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I.

BEER IN AMERICA: THE INDUSTRY AND THE ADVENT OF CRAFT BEER

The close relationship between beer and society that had
existed in Europe survived the migration to America 24 and has
today culminated in the craft beer revolution. 25
American
colonists brought the tradition of beer to the New World. 26 At
first, Americans produced beer locally, and typically in the
home.27 Industrialization in the nineteenth century then allowed
for the development of commercial brewing,28 and by 1900, there
were 1,816 breweries in the United States. 29 However, by 1978,
that number had dwindled to eighty-nine breweries 30 because of a

24. See MITTELMAN, supra note 3, at 5–6 (outlining the history of beer in
Europe and its transportation to Colonial America).
25. Number of Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation
.org/statistics/number-of-breweries (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (detailing data
on the prevalence of craft breweries); see also Craft Brewer Defined, BREWERS
ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/craft-brewer-defined (last
visited Nov. 15, 2015) (defining criteria for craft breweries).
26. See MITTELMAN, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that the first American
settlers came from societies of beer drinkers and that all European ships to
America provided beer provisions).
27. Id. at 6–7. Home production was made possible by beer’s simple
ingredients: (1) barley or grain; (2) hops; (3) cultured yeast; and (4) water.
See Elzinga, supra note 3, at 85. Some families served beer to the public out
of their homes, creating the first American drinking establishments.
MITTELMAN, supra note 3, at 7 (explaining that home production was the
norm because of transportation difficulties and that home production evolved
into “rudimentary drinking establishments”). The popularity of these
establishments grew, and by the eighteenth century, most colonists in
Connecticut, for example, were no more than three miles from such places.
Id. at 9.
28. K. Austin Kerr, The American Brewing Industry, 1865-1920, in THE
DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BREWING INDUSTRY SINCE 1800, at 176, 176–
77 (R. G. Wilson & T. R. Gourvish eds., 1998). Before the American
Industrial Revolution, most breweries were small, local business. Id. at 176.
Brewing, like other industries such as food-processing, benefited by using
industrial processes. Id. at 177. The industrial revolution allowed for the
development of large “shipping brewer[ies]”, such as Pabst and AnheuserBusch. Id. at 176–77. The industrial processes allowed these breweries to
vertically integrate, establish substantial factories, and create complex
national distribution systems. Id. at 177. These breweries benefited from
the increased access to capital and the development of a complete national
railway. Id. Increased scientific knowledge solved quality-maintenance
issues, allowing for longer transportation. Id. at 178–79.
29. Number of Breweries, supra note 25.
30. Id.
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“merger-acquisition trend,” 31 as well as the impact of economies of
scale. 32
As the number of breweries decreased, one brewery opened
that would spark a change in the industry. The 1976 opening of
New Albion Brewery marked the end of this decline and the
beginning of the craft beer revolution.33 The founder, Jack
McAuliffe, brewed with recycled dairy equipment and Pepsi-Cola
syrup drums. 34 While the brewery closed six years later, it left its
mark as “the most important failed brewery in the industry’s
history” by inspiring other entrepreneurs to start craft
breweries.35 By 1995, the number of breweries climbed to 858. 36
And by 2013, craft breweries represented 98% of the then-almost
3,000 breweries established. 37 As of late 2015, the number of
31. Elzinga, supra note 3, at 92. There were about 170 horizontal
brewery mergers between 1950 and 1983. See id. During this time period,
the government took action to stop some mergers on antitrust bases and thus
forced breweries to focus improvement efforts on creating efficiencies in the
production process. Id.
32. Id. at 94. Economies of scale refers to the reduction in production
costs per beer that large breweries realize as a result of large-scale
production, which generates efficiencies, such as a closer-to-capacity
operation of bottling lines and various automation savings. Elzinga, supra
note 3, at 97.
33. MITTELMAN, supra note 3, at 186 (“Most industry observers consider
New Albion to be the country’s first micro-brewer.”).
34. Devin Leonard, Jack McAuliffe, Father of American Craft Brew,
Brings Back New Albion Ale, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 29, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-29/jack-mcauliffe-father-ofamerican-craft-brew-brings-back-new-albion-ale.
35. Id. at 291 (quoting MAUREEN OGLE, AMBITIOUS BREW: THE STORY OF
AMERICAN BEER (2007)). In 2013, the Boston Beer Company helped to revive
New Albion Ale, and Jack McAuliffe’s daughter is working to continue
production independently as New Albion Brewing Company. About Us, NEW
ALBION BREWING CO., http://www.newalbionbrewing.com/about-us (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015).
36. Number of Breweries, supra note 25.
37. Brewers Association Announces 2013 Craft Brewer Growth, BREWERS
ASS’N. https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/brewers-association
-announces-2013-craft-brewer-growth/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). The rise
in popularity of craft beer has led to large breweries developing what the
Brewers Association has termed “crafty” beer. Craft vs. Crafty: A Statement
from the Brewers Association, BREWERS ASS’N, (Dec. 13, 2012),
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/craft-vs-crafty-a-statement
-from-the-brewers-association. Many large breweries have attempted to
imitate the beer of actual craft breweries. Id. For instance, MillerCoors, a—
for now—joint venture between brewing behemoths SABMiller and Molson
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breweries had rapidly grown to over 4,000. 38
The modern brewing industry contains both macrobreweries
The largest breweries are the
and craft breweries. 39
macrobreweries, which each produced an average of seventy-nine
million barrels of beer in 2012. 40 In 2013, there were fewer than
thirty macrobrewery entities, with Anheuser-Busch InBev and
MillerCoors Brewing Company as perhaps the most prominent
examples. 41 In contrast, the Brewer’s Association 42 defines a craft
brewery as a brewery that: (1) produces six million barrels of beer
or less annually; (2) is mostly independently owned; and (3) uses
mostly “traditional or innovative” ingredients in its beers.43 Craft
breweries can be further defined 44 as microbreweries, 45
Coors, produces Blue Moon Belgian Wheat Beer, and Anheuser-Busch InBev
produces Shock Top. Id.; Great Beers, MILLERCOORS, http://www.miller
coors.com/Our-Beers/Great-Beers.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
38. Bart Watson, U.S. Passes 4,000 Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N (Sept. 28,
2015), https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/4000-breweries/.
39. Craft Brewer Defined, supra note 25.
40. Id. (defining large domestic producers as those shipping 10 million
barrels or more).
41. Number of Breweries, supra note 25; Brewers Association Lists Top
50 Breweries of 2014, BREWERS ASS’N (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.brewers
association.org/press-releases/brewers-association-lists-top-50-breweries-of2014/.
42. The Brewers Association is a trade group that promotes craft beer
and homebrewing. Purpose, BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.
org/brewers-association/purpose (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
43. Craft Brewer Defined, supra note 25. To be “independently owned,”
less than 25% “of the craft brewery [may be] owned or controlled (or
equivalent economic interest) by an alcoholic beverage industry member that
is not itself a craft brewer.” Id. A “traditional” brewery is one “that has a
majority of its total beverage alcohol volume in beers whose flavor derives
from traditional or innovative brewing ingredients and their fermentation.”
Id.
44. See Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, BREWERS ASS’N,
http://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/market-segments (last visited
Nov. 20, 2015).
45. Microbreweries sell at least 75% of their beer off-site from the
brewery and produce less than 15,000 barrels of beer each year. Id. In 2014,
there were 1,871 microbreweries—a 28% increase from 2013. See Number of
Breweries, supra note 25. Wisconsin’s Central Water Brewery is—for now—
an example of a microbrewery, which went from producing 750 barrels in its
first year to being on pace to produce 14,000 barrels in 2014. Chelsey Lewis,
Central Waters Serves Up Tasty, Eco-conscious Beer, WIS. TRAILS,
http://www.wisconsintrails.com/travel/central-waters-serves-up-tasty-ecoconscious-beer-b99228417z1-251506411.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
Smaller microbreweries that sell less than thirty barrels a year are
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brewpubs, 46 contract brewing companies,47 and regional craft
breweries.48
Breweries franchise with distributors (also known as
wholesalers), who are responsible for the transportation of beer
from the brewery to the retailer.49 Since the 1970s, distributors
have consolidated, which can, in part, be attributed to the
distributor response to large breweries’ consolidations. 50 In 1970,
there were approximately 6,000 distributors, shipping an average
of 20,000 barrels each year, but this average has now increased to
150,000 barrels.51 The largest distributors ship around 10 million
sometimes referred to as nanobreweries. Jack Kleban & Ingeborg Nickerson,
The U.S. Craft Brew Industry, in 18 PROC. INT’L ACAD. FOR CASE STUD. no. 1,
33, 35 (2011), http://www.alliedacademies.biz/Public/Proceedings/Proceedings
28/IACS%20Proceedings%20Spring%202011.pdf; Cf. Mark Garrison, Pint
Sized, SLATE (Dec. 12, 2012, 5:19 PM), www.slate.com/articles/business/
drink/2012/12/nanobrewing_how_tiny_beer_making_operations_are_changin
g_the_industry.html (noting that the Brewers Association has not provided
an official definition of a nanobrewery).
46. Brewpubs are establishments that encompass both a restaurant and
a brewery, and sell 25% or more of its beer at their facility. Craft Beer
Industry Market Segments, supra note 44. In 2014, there were 1,412
brewpubs—up 10.3% from 2013. Number of Breweries, supra note 25.
47. Contract brewing companies hire another brewery to produce all or
some of their beer. Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, supra note 44. For
instance, CB Craft Brewers contracts with breweries, such as Three Heads
Brewing and Keuka Brewing Company, that are unable to produce on a large
enough scale. Contract Beers, CB CRAFT BREWERS, http://www.cbcraftbrewers
.com/our-beers/contract-beers (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
48. Regional craft breweries, which make up the majority of the craftbrewing industry, each produce between 15,000 barrels and 6,000,000 barrels
of beer annually. Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, supra note 44. In
2014, there were 135 regional craft brewers. Number of Breweries, supra
note 25. This number is 13.4% higher than that in 2013. Id. A well-known
regional craft brewery is the Delaware-based Dogfish Head, which produced
around 200,000 barrels in 2013. Chris Furnari, Dogfish Head up 17 Percent
in 2013, BREWBOUND (Jan. 17, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://www.brewbound.com/
news/dogfish-head-up-17-percent-in-2013.
49. See DOUGLAS GLEN WHITMAN, STRANGE BREW: ALCOHOL AND
GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY 41 n.1 (2003) (describing the franchise relationship);
What Is a Beer Distributor?, NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, http://www.nb
wa.org/about/what-is-a-beer-distributor (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
50. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2218 (describing distributors as moving
from “small family-owned operations to much larger corporations”); see
WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 2025.
51. Bart Watson, Franchise Laws: Leveling the Playing Field, BREWERS
ASS’N (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/franchiselaws.
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barrels per year—more than any brewery produces, except for the
three largest macrobreweries. 52 Between 2000 and 2010, the five
largest distributors increased their market share from one-third to
one-half.53 These data indicate a trend of distributors shifting
from small businesses to larger corporations. 54
Meanwhile, the craft brewery market is composed of several
growing segments. 55 This trend of growth is a reverse of the
decline in number that breweries generally experienced between
the early 1940s and the late 1970s.56 But while this decline in
total number of breweries has reversed since the 1970s, an
opposite trend seems to have affected the beer distributor market,
with distributors’ average shipping amount greatly increasing as
the total number of distributors has declined. 57 Lawmakers have
considered the contractual relationship between breweries and
distributors in developing beer laws. 58
II. MODERN REGULATION OF BEER: THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM AND
BEER FRANCHISE LAWS

The modern three-tier system that separates breweries,
distributors, and retailers is influenced, at least in part, by the
desire of temperance advocates to promote regulations that would
moderate some of alcohol’s ill-effects on society. 59
States
supplement the three-tier system with beer franchise laws that
provide contractual protections for distributors, including
franchise protections related to territory, termination, transfer,
damages and procedure, and operations. 60
By separating
52. Id.
53. See ALIA AKKAM & KRISTEN WOLFE BIELER, DECADE IN REVIEW 20002009, at 4 (2010), http://www.bevnetwork.com/pdf/jan10_decade.pdf; see also
Watson, supra note 51 (“[T]he top two beer wholesalers now control roughly
10% of the beer market. This is in stark contrast to the past, when there
were more beer wholesalers who were, on average, much smaller.”).
54. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2218.
55. See Number of Breweries, supra note 25.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See infra Part II (explaining the development of beer distribution
regulations in the United States).
59. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2209–10 (describing John D. Rockefeller’s
effort to implement regulation after prohibition, including the three-tier
system).
60. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–08 (explaining the
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breweries, distributors, and retailers into three tiers, the threetier system prevents self-distribution and direct-sale by breweries,
but some states have created exemptions.61
A. The Roots of Beer Regulation in the Temperance Movement:
The Three-Tier System
The temperance movement of the early twentieth century
fertilized the roots of modern beer regulation. 62 Advocates of the
temperance movement proposed the development of the three-tier
system after the prohibition on alcohol was lifted. 63 The new
regulatory system was intended to prevent abuses by breweries. 64
Despite implementers’ good intentions, opponents to this system
argue that it lamentably increases prices within the alcohol
market. 65
The temperance movement started as a church-sponsored
movement, and its advocates fought to control alcohol
consumption by various means, including regulation. 66 Much of
the public viewed breweries as “mischievously increasing
consumption, causing the drunkenness and financial ruin of
citizens.” 67 Specifically, the movement sought to discourage direct
relationships between breweries and retailers—termed “tied
houses”—where breweries owned the retail establishments
development of the beer franchise laws and that the laws function within the
context of the three-tier system).
61. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231 (categorizing self-distribution as a
favorable alternative for craft brewers to the three-tier system).
62. See David R. Scott, Comment, Brewing Up a Century of Beer: How
North Carolina Laws Stifle Competition in the Beer Industry and How They
Should Be Changed, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 417, 420–21 (2013)
(detailing a temperance study and its proposal for the accepted three-tier
system and other rejected proposals); Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2208–09
(describing the same).
63. See Scott, supra note 62, at 421–22.
64. See id. at 422.
65. See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9.
66. 11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 622 (15th ed. 2002) (“The
movement spread rapidly under the influence of the churches.”); see Tamayo,
supra note 8, at 2207–08 (describing how pre-Prohibition temperance
advocates sought to “promote temperance [by] raising the price of the licenses
that were required to legally sell alcohol”).
67. Scott, supra note 62, at 420–21 (explaining that these attitudes
resulted from breweries owning retailers and providing financial incentives
to sell more product).
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directly or where breweries induced retailers to carry the
breweries’ brands exclusively. 68 Tied houses were thought to
allow breweries to coercively influence retailers in a manner that
caused public disruption. 69 To address these large brewery
abuses, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a temperance advocate and son of
the oil tycoon, commissioned a study devising alcohol regulation
plans for states to implement. 70 The study advocated for a threetier system, which was subsequently adopted by almost all
states. 71
The three-tier system operates by dividing breweries,
distributors, and retailers into different tiers, and is enforced by
requiring separate licenses at each level.72 The first tier consists
of breweries, which produce the beer.73 Breweries are required to
sell their beer to distributors.74 Distributors comprise the second
tier, and act as intermediaries between breweries and retailers by
transporting and refrigerating the beer.75 Retailers compose the
third tier, selling directly to consumers after purchasing the beer
States typically prohibit entities from
from distributors. 76
operating at more than one tier. 77 Thus, this system generally
prevents breweries from self-distributing to retailers or selling
directly to consumers. 78 To help enforce this regulatory system,
many states created alcohol agencies to help with the enforcement
of the three-tier system.79
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 419–21.
See id. at 421.
Id. For the report itself, see RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L.
SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL (1933).
71. Scott, supra note 62, at 418, 422.
72. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).
73. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 400.
74. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2204.
75. Id.; What Is a Beer Distributor?, supra note 49.
76. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2204.
77. See, e.g., id. (describing North Carolina’s three-tier system).
78. See id. at 2200–01. Self-distribution refers to breweries bypassing
the second tier and selling directly to retailers, instead of using distributors.
See infra Section II.B.2. On the other hand, direct selling or direct-sale refers
to breweries selling to consumers, bypassing both the second and third tiers.
See infra Section II.B.3.
79. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE ROLE OF ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE CONTROL AGENCIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT AND ADJUDICATION OF
ALCOHOL LAWS 3 (rev. Jul. 2005), http://docplayer.net/942334-The-role-ofalcohol-beverage-control-agencies-in-the-enforcement-and-adjudication-of-
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Opponents of the three-tier system argue that its structure
negatively impacts the alcohol industry. Specifically, they cite the
“double markup” effect, where, as beer passes through the tiers,
distributors and retailers “mark up” the price to create their own
profit.80 For instance, a brewery might sell a six-pack of beer to a
distributor for $8.00. To make a profit, the distributor might sell
that same-six pack to retailers for $9.00. The retailers might then
sell the six-pack to the consumer for $10.00. The principles of
supply and demand dictate that as the price increases, the
quantity demanded decreases.81
For that reason, fewer
consumers would be willing to buy the six-pack at $10.00 rather
than at the original $8.00 price. Therefore, some argue that
consumers purchase less beer because of the increased price
associated with the “double markup” effect. 82
Whether the three-tier system is essential to preventing large
brewery abuses, as advocates argue, 83 or unnecessarily increases
the price of beer while lowering demand, as opponents argue, 84 it
is clear that by adopting the three-tier system, states have greatly
influenced their beer markets.
B. Laws Supplementing the Three-Tier System
Lawmakers have implemented a variety of beer regulations,
in addition to the three-tier system, that generally favor
distributors. 85 Beer franchise laws supplement the three-tier

alcohol-laws.html.
80. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9 (explaining that the double
markup problem, a natural product of any non-integrated industry, is made
even worse by franchise termination laws).
81. Id. Demand is the amount of beer that consumers are willing to
purchase at a series of prices during a certain period of time. See DAVID E.
O’CONNOR & CHRISTOPHER FAILLE, BASIC ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES: A GUIDE FOR
STUDENTS 31 (2000). The law of demand dictates an inverse relationship
between the quantity demanded of the beer and the price of the beer. See id.
As a result, the quantity demanded by consumers at a particular price
decreases as the price of beer increases. See id. at 31–32.
82. See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9 (arguing that due to the
double markup problem, “consumers are worse off because they pay more for
the product and buy less”).
83. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2210–11.
84. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 1.
85. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402.
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system with contractual protections for distributors. 86 These
protections include mandated exclusive territory grants,
termination protections, transfer protections, damages and
procedural protections, and operational protections. 87 States also
supplement the three-tier system through laws that limit selfdistribution and direct-sale by breweries. 88
1.

Beer Franchise Laws

Many states supplement the three-tier system with other
Beer
forms of regulation, including beer franchise laws. 89
franchise laws regulate the franchise relationships between the
first-tier brewery-franchisors and the second-tier distributorfranchisees. 90 This franchise relationship is defined through
contractual agreements, which are regulated by franchise statutes
specific to the beer industry. 91
Most of the beer industry’s franchise laws developed in the
1970s and reflect the market conditions of that time.92 In the
1970s, market power was consolidated in a decreasing number of
breweries, while there remained a growing and considerable
number of distributors. 93 This change provided breweries with a
bargaining advantage over small, often family-owned,

86. See id. at 402–07 (explaining that legislatures enacted protections to
correct an “inherent imbalance of power” between breweries and
distributors); see also WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 7–8. For examples of state
statutory protections of the brewery-distributor relationships, see Illinois’s
Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act and Texas’s Beer Industry Fair Dealing Law.
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 720/1–10 (2014); TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 102.71–
102.82 (West 2013).
87. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402.
88. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231–35.
89. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402.
90. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2213. The term “franchise” is used to
refer to various relationships. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 41 n.1. The
narrower use refers to “product-license” and “trade-name” franchise
relationships. Id. However, as used in this Comment, it can also refer to
when businesses create a contractual relationship for the distribution of
products. Id.
91. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 397–99.
92. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2213 (noting that states enacted the
beer franchise laws “to protect what were then small, family-owned
distributors” from large breweries in the 1970s).
93. See Watson, supra note 51. The number of breweries dropped from
766 in 1935 to eighty-nine in 1978. Number of Breweries, supra note 25.
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distributors. 94 Breweries had more economic power and greater
choice of distributors, allowing them to better influence the
outcome of the franchise negotiations.95 If a brewery was
unsatisfied with the terms offered by a distributor, the brewery
had several other distributors it could bargain with for a better
agreement.
Beer franchise laws worked to correct the natural imbalance
in bargaining power between breweries and distributors by
creating statutorily mandated protections for distributors.96
These regulations attempted to prevent breweries from controlling
the outcome of the franchise negotiations.97 These protections
generally took five forms. First, many states enacted territorial
protections that required breweries to provide distributors with
exclusive sales territories. 98 Second, transfer protections limited
breweries’ abilities to prevent distributors from transferring
Third, termination protections limited
distribution rights. 99
breweries’ abilities to prematurely terminate agreements, and also
limited breweries’ abilities to not renew an agreement. 100 Fourth,
damages and procedural mandates provided protections when a
brewery terminated, failed to renew, or refused to transfer an
agreement, with breweries typically forced to pay “reasonable
compensation” regardless of the circumstances, and additional
damages when good cause was absent.101 Fifth, many states
enacted operational protections related to the discontinuance of a
particular line of beer and to prevent discrimination between
94. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402 (stating that many
legislatures passed laws to correct the imbalance that existed between
breweries and distributors).
95. See Watson, supra note 51. Still today, the largest macrobreweries
wield uneven power in franchise relationships with beer distributors. See
Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 399.
96. Cf. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07 (describing the
various types of statutory protections states have adopted in order to address
“an inherent imbalance of power”).
97. Id. at 402.
98. Id. at 402–03; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1401(1) (2015).
99. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 403–04; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §
474.045 (2013).
100. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 404–06; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 474.011, 474.015; 4 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 46 (2013).
101. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 406–07; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE §
23-1110 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-8A-9(E) (LexisNexis 2015).
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franchisees. 102
While each state’s laws differ, many
commonalities can be found between the states’ mandated
protections for distributors.
a.

Territorial Protections

Most states require a brewery to provide an exclusive sales
territory to a distributor. 103 As a result of the exclusive grant, no
other distributors are allowed to distribute the brewery’s product
in that geographic area. 104 Mandatory exclusive sales territories
are uncommon in franchise agreements outside of the beer
context;105 this mandatory nature in the beer industry is a
reflection of the legal environment in which states enacted these
laws.106 Due to concerns over anticompetitive effects, courts have
long held that exclusive sales territories to violate federal
antitrust laws unless state law mandated the exclusive grant. 107
Faced with this “all-or-nothing choice,” many states opted to
require exclusive territory grants in the beer industry for various
reasons. 108
102. 2 W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 16:2 (Thomson Reuters/West 2009); see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 313-5(5) (2012) (“No supplier shall . . . [i]mpose, attempt to impose, or enforce
against a wholesaler any requirement, standard of performance, or term,
including the terms of sale of malt beverages sold to the wholesaler, which is
discriminatory as compared with the requirements, standards, or terms
imposed by the supplier on other similarly situated wholesalers within this
state.”).
103. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402; see, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 436.1401(1) (“A [brewery] shall grant to each of its wholesalers an
exclusive sales territory, as agreed upon between the wholesaler and
[brewery], within which the wholesaler shall be the exclusive distributor of
the specified brand or brands of the [brewery].”).
104. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 23.
105. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–03. Outside of the beer
context, franchisors are generally allowed to grant exclusive territories to
their franchisees, but most often such rights are not granted. Id.
106. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 25.
107. See id. (citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967)) (stating that the United States Supreme Court had held exclusive
territories to be per se illegal unless required by state law).
108. Id. (stating that around half of states’ laws mandating exclusive
territories were enacted in the “all-or-nothing” legal environment). Prior to
1977, courts generally held exclusive sales territories to violate the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), unless required by state law. Id. Thus, state laws
either required or prohibited exclusive sales territories. Id. As a result, beer
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States enacted territorial protections to provide two benefits
for distributors. First, these laws protected distributors from the
“spillover effects” of their efforts to improve product value. 109
Distributors are often responsible for promoting and advertising a
brand of beer. 110
Economists argue that in non-exclusive
distribution agreements, distributors’ incentives to improve the
brand are reduced because some distributors may “free ride” on
the investments of other distributors.111 This free riding problem
may dissuade some distributors from making the investments
necessary to build brand loyalty—an effect known as the “shirking
problem.” 112 For instance, when a distributor promotes a product,
sales might increase, and those new customers associate their
purchase with the brand of beer rather than a specific distributor;
thus, when a distributor promotes in a non-exclusive territory, the
distributor does not exclusively realize the benefits of its
investment. 113 Some of the sales created by the advertising go to
other distributors that did not pay for the advertising. 114 A law
mandating an exclusive territory for the distributor may
reestablish the investment incentive.
In addition to recreating the incentive to promote, economists
argue that distributors potentially benefit from the ability to
charge a higher price when selling beer to retailers, which cannot
be “undercut” by competing distributors. 115 Other economists
franchise laws have generally reflected this mandatory nature. Id. For
example, Alabama requires that “[e]ach supplier of beer . . . grant in writing
to each of its wholesalers an exclusive sales territory.” ALA. CODE § 28-9-3
(2014). The Supreme Court has since overturned Arnold and held that
exclusive territorial agreements are not per se illegal, recognizing that
“[i]nterbrand competition . . . is the primary concern of antitrust law,” rather
than intrabrand competition. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 52 n.19, 57–59 (1977).
109. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 23.
110. See id. at 12.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See id. (“Other wholesalers can free ride off the work of those
wholesalers who improve the profitability of a brand name they share.”).
115. Id. at 24 (citing Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and
Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283 (1975))
(referencing Posner’s characterization of distributors as “cartels” and
explaining that exclusive territories reduce exposure to other distributors).
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argue this is not truly a benefit because raising prices only leads
consumers to purchase less beer, and thus distributors make less
money overall if the price is too high.116 Besides affecting sales,
some breweries also argue these protections provide distributors
with too much control over brand management, allowing
distributors to decide which brands to distribute and which
brands to leave in the warehouses. 117 Opponents to these
mandates make similar criticisms of other protections, including
transfer protections.
b.

Transfer Protections

Providing more expansive protections than typically seen in
other industries, most states have enacted transfer protections to
limit a brewery’s ability to prevent a distributor from transferring
its distribution rights to another distributor.118 For example, in
Rhode Island, “[n]o supplier shall, by the terms of an agreement or
otherwise, unreasonably withhold or delay approval of any
assignment, sale, or transfer of the stock of a [distributor].” 119
Though less common, these protections are not unheard of in
other industries. 120 The protections are often viewed with less
hostility than other protections because the terms of the franchise
agreement also transfer, and in that sense, business can continue
as usual. 121

116. See id.
117. Steve Hindy, Opinion, Free Craft Beer!, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/free-craft-beer.html
(opining that state laws allow “distributors to select brands and manage
them however they want—selling those they choose to sell, while letting
other brands sit in their warehouses”).
118. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 403–04; OR. REV. STAT. §
474.045 (2013) (“No supplier shall interfere with, prevent or unreasonably
delay the transfer of the wholesaler’s business or any interest therein if the
wholesaler has provided . . . written notice . . . and the transferee meets
reasonable standards and qualifications.”).
119. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-13-6 (2012).
120.
See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 404 (stating that transfer
protections in the beer industry “tend to exceed” transfer protections
generally found in franchisee laws).
121. Id. (stating that transfer protections are “less contentious” because
the franchisor still receives royalties and generally only the remaining terms
are transferred, allowing breweries to evaluate the distributor relationship at
renewal).
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Termination Protections

Many states mandate termination protections, which prevent
breweries from prematurely terminating franchise agreements or
failing to renew them without good cause.122
Most states
mandate only a good cause requirement, but some states require
further protections for distributors. 123 For example, Wisconsin
limits how breweries and distributors may define good cause for
termination and non-renewal. 124 The Wisconsin statute limits
good cause to when a distributor commits “material fraudulent
conduct,” makes “substantial misrepresentations,” commits a
felony, sells the beer outside of the authorized territory, or
becomes insolvent or institutes bankruptcy proceedings or
otherwise liquidates the business for the benefit of creditors. 125
This statutory good cause standard is meant to supersede broader
contractual definitions.126
Outside of the beer industry, franchise laws rarely mandate a
superseding, heightened good cause standard. 127 Proponents
argue this protection prevents “opportunism” by breweries. 128
They present a rationale similar to the one underlying territorial
protections: distributors must invest time and money in a
brewery’s brands,129 and if a brewery prematurely terminates a
contract, the distributor does not earn its expected return on its
initial investment of time, effort, and money because the benefits
of the investment are realized when the brand is later distributed
through a different distributor. 130 Violations of this protection
can sometimes lead to litigation in which case distributors benefit
from another set of protections. 131
122. Id.
123. See id. at 406.
124. See id.
125. WIS. STAT. § 125.33(10)(4)(c)(1)-(4) (2014).
126. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 405.
127. See id. at 406.
128. WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 10.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 10–11 (noting that a brewery might either “appropriate” value
by terminating a contract and transferring the network established to a
different distributor that is willing to accept “less-desirable terms,” or
“strong-arm price concessions” by threatening to find a new distributor).
131. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 406–07 (describing dispute
resolution protections and statutory damages provisions).
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d.

Damages and Procedural Protections

When there is conflict or litigation, distributors often benefit
from various statutory damages and procedural protections. 132
Damages protections permit a distributor to recover damages
when a brewery, without good cause, terminates an agreement,
does not renew an agreement, or refuses to transfer an
agreement. 133 For example, in Idaho, if the brewery terminates
without good cause, the distributor receives fair market value of
the distributor’s expenses related to that brand. 134 Even if a
brewery has “good cause,” Idaho still requires the payment of
“reasonable compensation” to distributors 135—a practice
uncommon outside of the beer industry. 136 These damages
protections work in conjunction with procedural protections, such
as venue and choice of law requirements favoring distributions, to
incentivize compliance with franchise agreements. 137
e.

Operational Protections

States have also enacted operational protections for
distributors, requiring breweries to comply with stringent
procedures in their operations. 138 Some operational protections
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. IDAHO CODE § 23-1110(2) (2015).
135. Id. § 23-1110(1). The statute requires reasonable compensation for
“the laid-in cost to the distributor of the inventory of the supplier’s products,
including any taxes paid on the inventory by the distributor, together with a
reasonable charge for handling of the products.” Id.; see also N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 60-8A-9(E) (LexisNexis 2015) (providing distributors the right to
recover treble damages when agreements are terminated in bad faith or not
for good cause).
136. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 406–07.
137. See id. at 406 (describing statutes imposing procedural protections,
such as venue and choice of law requirements favoring the distributor); see,
e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.6(a) (West Supp. 2015) (“A provision in
an agreement between a beer manufacturer and a beer wholesaler for the
sale and distribution of beer in this state, which restricts venue to a forum
outside this state, is void with respect to any claim arising under or relating
to the agreement involving a beer wholesaler operating within this state.”).
138. See GARNER, supra note 102, § 16:2; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-13-5(5) (2012)
(“No supplier shall . . . [i]mpose, attempt to impose, or enforce against a
wholesaler any requirement, standard of performance, or term, including the
terms of sale of malt beverages sold to the wholesaler, which is
discriminatory as compared with the requirements, standards, or terms
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relate to the discontinuance of a particular line of beer and
termination of a contract. 139 In Massachusetts, a brewery must
provide at least 120 days’ notice before discontinuing the sale of a
beer to a distributor. 140 Likewise, in Illinois, a brewery may not
terminate unless it has good cause and provides “written
notice.” 141
While some protections focus directly on the relationship
between a specific brewery and distributor, other protections, such
as nondiscrimination statutes, focus more broadly on a brewery’s
relationship with multiple distributors.142 For instance, in some
states, breweries are prevented from discriminating between
distributors. 143 In Wyoming, a brewery may not “discriminate,
either directly or indirectly, in price, programs, or terms of sale
offered to franchisees” where the discrimination would harm
competition or give a competitive advantage to a distributor. 144
Equal treatment of franchisees is a basic tenet of franchise law
and is premised on keeping “Pandora’s box to litigation” closed.145
Overall, beer franchise laws have provided distributors in the
beer industry with protections greater than those seen in other
industries. 146 The protections reflect the market conditions when
When the laws were
states implemented the laws.147
implemented, distributors were comparatively weak from an
imposed by the supplier on other similarly situated wholesalers within this
state.”).
139. Id.
140. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 138, § 25E (2010) (“The notice of discontinuance
of sale shall be furnished by the manufacturer, importer or wholesaler to the
wholesaler being discontinued at least one hundred and twenty days before
the effective date of such discontinuance.”).
141.
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 720/3–4 (2014) (stating that “no brewer or beer
wholesaler may cancel, fail to renew or otherwise terminate an agreement
unless the party intending that action has good cause for the cancellation”
and that notice “shall be in writing”).
142. See GARNER, supra note 102, § 16:2.
143. Id.
144. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-9-104(v) (LexisNexis 2015).
145. See COLEMAN R. ROSENFIELD, THE LAW OF FRANCHISING OF THE
FLORIDA AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT BARS § 57, at 68 (1970) (“It is a
cardinal rule that the franchise contract must be kept inviolate. In order to
so maintain the contract, the basic and fundamental rule is to treat each
franchisee equally.” (footnote omitted)).
146. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 405–07.
147. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2214.
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economic standpoint, and these protections strengthened the
bargaining position of distributors.148
However, the beer
franchise laws do not stand by themselves in protecting the threetier system and distributors. 149
2.

Self-Distribution Laws

Many states limit breweries’ abilities to self-distribute beer to
protect the validity of the three-tier system. 150 Self-distribution
occurs when a brewery distributes directly to retailers and
bypasses the second-tier distributors. 151 State laws regarding
self-distribution vary, but can be broadly categorized into the five
following groups: (1) no breweries may self-distribute;152 (2) small
craft breweries may self-distribute;153 (3) almost all craft
breweries may self-distribute; 154 (4) all breweries may selfdistribute;155 and (5) breweries may self-distribute through
retailers in which the brewery has a financial interest. 156 As of
2014, fourteen states, plus D.C., did not allow self-distribution,
while thirty-six states allowed for self-distribution in some
form. 157
Alabama, for example, strictly adheres to the three-tier
system, forbidding all breweries from “sell[ing] any alcoholic
beverages direct to any retailer.” 158 Maine is slightly less
148. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 407.
149. See infra Section II.B.2.
150. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231–35.
151. See id. at 2231.
152. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 512B, 512C (West Supp. 2014)
(allowing brewpubs and microbreweries to sell beer directly to customers on
their licensed premises, but mandating that distribution off-premises be
handled by wholesalers).
153. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D)(4) (2014).
154. See, e.g., 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(a) (2014) (allowing breweries
that produce up to 930,000 gallons per year to sell a limited amount directly
to retailers).
155. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 04.11.130(b)(2), 04.11.150 (West 2014)
(allowing brewers to sell beer to “a person who is licensed under this title,”
which includes “package store” licensees).
156. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D)(3), (4)(a).
157. Bart Watson, Dr. Statelaws: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love Self-Distribution, BREWERS ASS’N (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.brewers
association.org/insights/dr-statelaws-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-andlove-self-distribution [hereinafter Dr. Statelaws].
158. ALA. CODE §§ 28-3A-6(b), 28-9-1 (2014) (stating the intent of the
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restrictive, allowing craft breweries that produce up to 50,000
gallons a year to self-distribute. 159 Other states allow most craft
breweries to distribute directly to retailers. 160 For example, in
Illinois, a craft brewery producing less than 930,000 gallons of
beer each year may apply for an exemption to self-distribute no
more than 232,500 gallons of its beer.161 California has removed
the second-tier requirement altogether and allows all breweries to
sell directly to any person allowed to purchase beer. 162
While many states have focused their exemptions on a
brewery’s annual production, other states, such as Arizona, have
changed their rules to no longer prohibit breweries from
possessing a financial interest in retailers or distributors. 163
Others allow craft breweries to have a financial interest in
retailers or distributors through which the brewery can
distribute.164 For instance, in Minnesota, breweries that produce
up to 20,000 barrels may have a financial interest in a distributor
that sells only that brewery’s products.165 Similarly, in Arizona, a
“microbrewery” may distribute beer to retailers that are “under
common ownership” with the brewery.166
statute is, in part, to “maintain a sound, stable, and viable three-tier system
of distribution of beer to the public”).
159. ME. STAT. tit. 28-A, § 1355-A(3)(B)(2) (2014).
160. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-10 (West 2014) (allowing breweries of
any size to self-distribute to retailers, provided the brewery holds the correct
license).
161. 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-12(18)(A) (2014) (“A class 1 brewer licensee,
who must also be either a licensed brewer or licensed non-resident dealer and
annually manufacture less than 930,000 gallons of beer, may make
application to the State Commission for a self-distribution exemption to allow
the sale of not more than 232,500 gallons of the exemption holder’s beer to
retail licensees per year.”).
162. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357(a) (West Supp. 2015) (stating that
licensed breweries are allowed to sell to any person holding a license to sell
beer and may offer beer for consumer purchase at the brewery).
163. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D) (2014) (allowing
microbreweries up to seven retail licenses to operate off-site retail locations
within the state).
164. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 340A.301(9)(g) (2014).
165. Id.
166. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D)(3), (4) (stating that a
microbrewery may sell to any retail licensees that are “under common
ownership . . . in any amount” and to other licensed retailers up to 93,000
gallons). The statute defines a microbrewery as a brewery that produces not
more than 6,200,000 gallons per year. Id. § 4-205.08(D)(2).

ANHALT FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/5/2016 1:15 PM

184 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:162
The reason many states have enacted a self-distribution
exemption to the three-tier system is to correct the small brewers’
dilemma in which distributors lack much incentive to promote or
distribute small brands. 167 Distributors lack incentive because a
new craft brewery’s brand often has little initial value. 168 These
craft breweries have not yet established relationships with
retailers and consumers. 169 Supporters of the exemption argue
that through self-distribution, breweries can create value by selfpromoting their brands, which makes the brands more attractive
to prospective distributors. 170 Data have suggested that states
with self-distribution have a higher number of craft breweries per
capita and have higher beer production levels.171 The National
Beer Wholesalers Association (“NBWA”) 172 has lobbied against
these laws, seeking to limit any exemptions to laws prohibiting
self-distribution.173 Some state laws reflect a compromise of both
positions; for example, in Kentucky, while “microbreweries” may
sell beer on-site for off-site consumption, the microbrewery must
have an agreement with a distributor if it wants to distribute its
product to other retail sites. 174
167. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–33.
168. Id. at 2233.
169. See id.
170. Id. (citing Abram Goldman-Armstrong, Buy a Truck!: The SelfDistribution Option, AM. BREWER, Summer 2009, at 6, 6–7).
171. Dr. Statelaws, supra note 157. There is a statistically significant gap
in the number of craft breweries per capita in states with self-distribution
and those without self-distribution. In 2013, states with self-distribution had
1.41 craft breweries per 100,000 people over the age of 21, while states
without had 0.77. Id. Along the same lines, production of those breweries is
higher in states with self-distribution: states with self-distribution had an
average of 2.51 gallons produced per person over the age of 21 in 2013, while
states without had an average of 1.05 gallons produced. Id.
172. The National Beer Wholesalers Association represents around 3,300
beer distributors. NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASSOC., 2014-2015 REPORT 1
(2014), https://www.nbwa.org/sites/default/files/NBWA_2014-2015_Report_1.
pdf.
173. Michelle Minton, Avoid a Beer Monopoly By Setting the Market Free,
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Dec. 11, 2012), http://cei.org/onpoint/avoid-beermonopoly-setting-market-free (describing the NBWA as “vehemently opposed
[to] any relaxation of the mandatory three-tier system,” that lobbied Illinois
lawmakers to minimize a self-distribution exemption to breweries producing
less than 15,000 barrels each year and distributing 7,500 barrels or less
independently each year).
174. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.157 (West 2014). The statute defines
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Exemptions to the distribution laws take many forms. 175
Each exemption allows certain breweries to get around the
problem of distributors lacking incentive to distribute new
brands. 176 Although distributors are generally opposed to these
exemptions,177 some states have maintained self-distribution
exemptions in addition to a similar exemption to the three-tier
system, which allows for sales made directly to consumers. 178
3.

Direct Sale

In addition to limiting self-distribution, most states limit the
ability of breweries to sell beer directly to consumers. 179 Direct
selling differs from self-distribution because self-distribution
allows a brewery to distribute directly to retailers, while direct
selling allows a brewery to sell directly to consumers. 180
Generally, there are six categories that states fall into with
respect to laws governing the direct sale between breweries and
customers: (1) breweries may not directly sell to consumers; 181 (2)
breweries may provide consumers limited “samples,” with or
without charge, to be consumed on-site; 182 (3) breweries may sell
to consumers on-site to be consumed off-site;183 (4) breweries may
operate brewpubs; 184 (5) only “small” craft breweries may directly
sell to consumers; 185 and (6) all breweries may directly sell to
consumers.186 Some states have adopted more than one of these
“microbreweries” as a brewery that produces less than 25,000 barrels a year.
Id. § 243.157(1)(a).
175. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D)(4)(b) (2014) (allowing
only small breweries to self-distribute to retailers), with ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
04.11.130(b)(2) (West 2014) (allowing all breweries to self-distribute to
retailers).
176. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–33.
177. See Minton, supra note 169.
178. See infra Section II.B.3.
179. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-213 to -214 (2015) (allowing
breweries to provide only “samples,” with or without charge, on the premises
where it is produced).
180. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–33 (discussing self-distribution).
181. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-3-46(2) (2014).
182. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-3A-6(h) (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3213(2).
183. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-308b(a)(3) (West 2014).
184. See, e.g., id. § 41-308b(a)(5).
185. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 28-A, § 1355-A(2)(D) (2014).
186. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357(a) (West Supp. 2015).

ANHALT FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/5/2016 1:15 PM

186 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:162
approaches. 187 For example, Kansas allows for brewpubs while
also permitting small breweries to sell beer to consumers for offsite consumption. 188
In regulating distribution and sale, states must still remain
cognizant of constitutional protections in drafting the exemptions.
In Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme Court
addressed a direct-selling regulation in the wine industry, holding
that state laws violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when they
allow direct sale by in-state wineries, but not by out-of-state
wineries. 189 The Court reasoned that state laws run afoul of the
Dormant Commerce Clause if they “mandate ‘differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter.’”190 The decision
prevented reciprocal agreements where in-state manufacturers
could directly sell to consumers, but out-of-state manufacturers
could directly sell only if their home state reciprocally allowed
those in-state manufacturers to directly sell.191 Some attorneys
have argued that Granholm applies to the beer context and that
some existing state beer laws violate this ruling. 192 For example,
one commentator has argued that a Pennsylvania provision
violates this rule by allowing in-state breweries to directly sell,
but not allowing out-of-state breweries to do the same. 193
Similar to self-distribution, direct-sale exemptions take many
different forms.194 In attempting to regulate breweries’ direct
sales to consumers, some states might create Dormant Commerce
Clause problems, such as those seen in the wine industry. 195 The
relevancy of the direct-sale issue has increased as technology has
187. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-308b (providing for brewpubs as well
as direct sale of beer to be consumed off-site).
188. Id.
189. 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).
190. Id. at 472 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality,
511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
191. See id. at 472–76.
192. See, e.g., David Scott, Don’t Forget the Beer, [May 28, 2013]
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST.: ONPOINT 182, at 1, available at http://heartland.
org/sites/default/files/david_scott-_dont_forget_the_beer.pdf.
193. See id. (citing 47 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4-431 (2012)).
194. Compare ALA. CODE § 28-3A-6(h) (2014) (allowing breweries to
provide on-site samplings and tastings), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.124
(West 2014) (allowing small breweries to directly sell to consumers).
195. See Scott, supra note 192.

ANHALT FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

CRAFTING A BEER LAW

2/5/2016 1:15 PM

187

developed. 196
C. The Influence of the Internet
With the growth of e-commerce, a craft beer black market has
developed. 197 If a state does not allow breweries to sell directly to
consumers or self-distribute to retailers, and if no distributor will
distribute a brewery’s beer, then consumers are severely limited
in their ability to purchase the product. 198 Some consumers have
turned to illegally selling and purchasing beer on the Internet. 199
In 2013, an individual was charged after selling five cases of
Heady Topper brand beer for $825 on Craigslist—a beer that
normally is sold for $72 a case. 200 Similarly, eBay auctioneers
attempted to sell Russian River Brewing’s Pliny the Elder beer—
normally selling for $5 a bottle—for between $15 and $50 a
bottle.201 The “Alcohol Policy” of eBay states that it does not
generally permit alcoholic beverages to be sold, but eBay may, at
its own discretion, allow sales by pre-approved sellers. 202 This
policy parallels state laws that prohibit the resale of beer by
unlicensed sellers. 203 Thus, most online beer companies ship only
to a limited number of states through private shipping
companies.204 Because consumers’ options are limited, they often
196. See infra Section II.C.
197. Lisa Rathke, Craze for Coveted Craft Brews Creates Black Market,
ASSOC. PRESS (Dec. 6, 2013, 10:54 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/crazecoveted-craft-brews-creates-black-market.
198. See Chen, supra note 10, at 541–42.
199. Id. at 542; Rathke, supra note 197.
200. Rathke, supra note 197. Heady Topper, produced by The Alchemist
brewery, is rated one of the top beers in the world by Beer Advocate. Id. It is
sold only in select bars and package stores in Vermont. Kristi Palma, How to
Get Your Hands on Heady Topper Beer, BOSTON (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:57 PM),
http://www.boston.com/travel/new-england/road-trip-where-find-the-wildlypopular-heady-topper-beer/KbDEBQe020VHFOa0NxkrZI/gallery.html.
201. Rathke, supra note 197.
202. Alcohol Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/alcohol.html
(last visited Dec 13, 2015). Slightly more restrictive, Craigslist prohibits the
sale of alcohol on its website without exemption. Prohibited, CRAIGSLIST,
http://www.craigslist.org/about/prohibited (last visited Dec. 13, 2015).
Additionally, the United States Postal Service does not allow shipment of
alcohol in the mail. Shipping Restrictions, USPS, https://www.usps.com/ship/
can-you-ship-it.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2015).
203. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-3A-3(a)(6) (2014).
204. See Beer of the Month Clubs, HALF TIME BEVERAGE, http://www.half
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struggle to legally purchase certain brands of beer. 205
The inability to purchase certain types of beer is problematic
because consumers are demanding increased variety in beer. 206 A
2012 study reported that 71% of beer drinkers responded that
they enjoy having variety in the style of craft beer they drink. 207
In response to this demand, the number of new beer releases
increased by 113% between 2012 and 2013. 208 Further, in the
first eight months of 2014, variety pack sales of beer increased by
21%. 209 Current laws are preventing consumers from better
enjoying their desired variety. 210
In its general form, the three-tier system separates breweries,
distributors, and retailers onto three separate tiers.211 Beer
franchise laws supplement the three-tier system by providing
contractual protections for distributors, including those related to
territories, termination, transfer, damages and procedure, and
operations.212 The three-tier system, when strictly applied,
prevents self-distribution and direct-sale by breweries.213
However, some states have created a range of exemptions. 214 The
growth of e-commerce compounded by distribution difficulties for
craft breweries has led to the development of an online black
market for craft beer.215 This Comment proposes a model state

timebeverage.com/beer-club.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2015). Half Time
Beverage ships to twenty-one states as well as D.C. See id. Courts have
reasoned that state laws can apply to out-of-state companies selling beer
online to consumers in that state. See, e.g., State v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., 29
S.W.3d 828, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
205. See Chen, supra note 10, at 541–42.
206. See David Eisenberg, Mintel: Millennials Demand More Variety,
BREWBOUND (Jan. 30, 2014, 2:24 PM), http://www.brewbound.com/news/
mintel-millennials-demand-more-variety (describing a study revealing
shifting tastes in alcoholic beverages, with a focus on Millennials).
207. Bart Watson, A Cheers to Craft Beer Choices, BREWERS ASS’N (Aug.
19, 2014), https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/craft_beer_choices/.
208. Eisenberg, supra note 206.
209. Eric Gorski, Blog, Variety Pack Sales Jump as Beer Drinkers Seek
Choices, DENVER POST: FIRST DRAFTS (Sep. 14, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://blogs.
denverpost.com/beer/2014/09/14/craft-beer-variety-packs/13879/.
210. See Chen, supra note 10, at 541–42.
211. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2200–01.
212. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07.
213. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2200–01.
214. See id. at 2231–35.
215. See Rathke, supra note 197.
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law to remedy these problems.216
III. THE MODEL LAW: CORRECTING REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE VARIETY
AND COMPETITION

Many states’ current beer regulations fail in two respects.
First, states’ regulations do not promote the variety in beer
selection that consumers are demanding. 217 At the same time,
many state laws do not promote competition—a basic tenet of the
American economic system. 218 To correct these problems, four
considerations need to guide states’ modifications.
First,
regulations must correct distributors’ bargaining advantages over
craft breweries that result from the mandated protections. 219
Second, state legislators must be cognizant of a remaining
rationale behind certain protections: distributors make
investments in brands with the expectation of a return on
investment. 220 Third, beer regulations must also consider that
most macrobreweries still retain a natural bargaining advantage
over distributors.221 Finally, regulations must provide consumers
with sufficient access to beer through self-distribution and directsale, while also alleviating breweries’ concerns about choosing
between pursuing growth and maintaining exemption
qualifications. 222 These four considerations will shape regulations
to reflect the current market and best promote variety and
competition.
216. See infra Appendix.
217. See Bullard, supra note 2.
218. O’CONNOR & FAILLE, supra note 81, at 31–32 (stating that the law of
demand dictates an inverse relationship between the quantity demanded of a
product and the price of the product). Because current regulations increase
the price of beer, the quantity demanded decreases. See id.
219. See supra Section II.B.1.
220. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 10–13 (stating that distributors’
typical investment in beer brands includes providing brand promotion and
advertising to retailers, supplying “useful information” about the beer,
“assuring reliable and frequent deliveries,” and utilizing correct storage and
refrigeration procedures).
221. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 399 (stating that power in
franchise relationships most often tips in favor of large breweries like
Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillersCoors, who “dominate” the beer market
with 80% control over United States sales).
222. See supra Sections II.B.1 & II.B.2.
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These proposed changes are discussed in more depth below, as
they are molded in this Comment’s proposed model law.223 This
model retains the three-tier system to prevent large-brewery
abuses.224 The proposal, however, exempts small breweries,
allowing them to self-distribute to retailers and directly sell to
consumers.225 The Model Law also exempts small breweries from
the beer franchise mandates that require exclusive grants of
territories and termination protections. 226 State agencies would
set the specific exemption limits. 227 By making these changes,
states would promote both the variety and competition necessary
to foster a healthy beer market.
A. Retention of the Three-Tier System
Lawmakers enacted the three-tier system to prevent abuses
by large breweries, including breweries’ coercive influence on
retailers.228 Due to the consolidation of power amongst the
largest macrobreweries,229 this potential for abuse still exists
today. As a result, the Model Law maintains the three-tier system
and supplements it with additional anti-coercion provisions and
prohibitions on financial interests between tiers.230 The division
of entities into separate tiers diminishes the opportunity for large
breweries to inappropriately influence both distributors and
223. The Model Law is not intended to be an overview of an entire alcohol
regulation but rather is meant to illustrate remedies to the problems
harming competition and reducing variety in the beer industry. In order to
draw a model law, the following examples use “plain English terms,” which
might result in an oversimplification of certain sections. Additionally, state
regulation often depends on the market of the individual state, and this
individualized-approach requirement might also result in oversimplification
for certain sections.
224. See infra Section III.A.
225. See infra Section III.C.
226. See infra Section III.B.
227. See infra Section III.B.2.
228. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–6 (noting that the three-tier
system was intended to prevent direct relationships between breweries and
retailers, which were thought to encourage excessive alcohol consumption).
229. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 399 (stating that breweries,
such as Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillerCoors, retain a large amount of
market power which allows them to “dominate the beer distribution
relationship”).
230. See infra Section III.A.2 (providing the three-tier system provisions
of the Model Law).
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retailers.231
1.

Problems in Eliminating the Three-Tier System

The three-tier system is still the best way to prevent large
brewery abuses. Alternative remedies do not translate well into
legislation and are not more effective at stopping the abuses. 232
Eliminating the three-tier system would only expand the potential
for abuses from the brewery–distributor relationship to the
brewery–retailer context. 233 Additionally, such an elimination is
not politically feasible because of the NBWA’s political
influence. 234 Consequently, the Model Law retains the three-tier
system and supplements it with other protections.
The three-tier system was intended to prevent two abuses: (1)
direct relationships—termed “tied houses”—between breweries
and retailers;235 and (2) coercion and undue influence on retailers
outside of the context of financial ownership by breweries. 236
“Tied houses” and undue influence often resulted in retailers
exclusively carrying one brewery’s brands. 237 Opponents of the
three-tier system argue that these abuses can be better prevented
by other means, 238 but these arguments are without merit.

231. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–6 (describing the function of the
tiers as preventing breweries from exerting too much influence on the
market).
232. See Ross Appel, Is a Mandatory Three Tier System Necessary?,
KOMLOSSY L., P.A. (Jan. 27, 2014), http://komlossylaw.com/threetier.
233. For example, it could lead to large breweries extending to retailers
their current practice of offering “incentives” for distributors to exclude other
breweries’ products. See A-B Expands Wholesaler Plan, Incentives, ST. LOUIS
BUS. J. (Apr 3, 2008, 5:19 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/
2008/03/31/daily73.html?page=all [hereinafter A-B Wholesaler Plan]; Tripp
Mickle, Craft Brewers Take Issue with AB InBev Distribution Plan, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 7, 2015, 2:16 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/craft-brewers-take-issuewith-ab-inbev-distribution-plan-1449227668.
234. Disbursements, National Beer Wholesalers Association Political
Action Committee Filing #992573, SUNLIGHT FOUND.: INFLUENCE EXPLORER,
http://realtime.influenceexplorer.com/filings/992573/SB/ (last updated Jan.
18, 2016) [hereinafter Disbursements] (providing campaign finance data for
the National Beer Wholesalers Association for federal and state elections,
including candidates and organizations that received money).
235. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–6.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 3–4.
238. See Appel, supra note 232.
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Opponents argue that states should instead prohibit financial
ownership of retailers by breweries and regulate coercive behavior
by prohibiting “slot fees” that ensure complete ownership of a
store’s shelf space and a bar’s taps. 239
While prohibiting
ownership interests between breweries and retailers can prevent
tied houses, such changes would fail to protect retailers from
coercion and undue influence.240 Prohibiting slot fees that ensure
complete ownership of a store’s shelf space and a bar’s taps would
not translate well to legislation because this proposal raises
several problematic questions. For instance, what would be the
proper amount of breweries a retailer must then buy from? How
should the law be enforced? Would the law include rural retailers
that might face increased transaction costs by purchasing from
more breweries? What would be the consequences for violations,
which often would be unintentional in an industry frequently
affected by mergers and acquisitions? 241 The transactional costs
alone would outweigh any benefits. Because of associated costs
and implementation difficulties, prohibiting ownership and slot
fees is far from the ideal approach. 242 Even if the legislature
could appropriately detail the requirements, effectiveness would
prove to be troublesome.
In addition to the likely political problems, these alternatives,
even if implemented, would fail to adequately impact large
brewery abuses. First, in states prohibiting the purchase of taps,
these changes have failed to prevent the purchase of bar taps. 243
239. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the three-tier system is no longer needed
because tied-houses can be prevented through prohibiting financial
relationships and through legislation such as prohibitions of slot fees).
240. Contra id. (reasoning that the three-tier system is no longer needed,
but incorrectly characterizing the three-tier system as having only the
purpose of preventing tied-houses rather than also preventing coercion and
undue influence).
241. See PHILIP H. HOWARD, TOO BIG TO ALE? GLOBALIZATION AND
CONSOLIDATION IN THE BEER INDUSTRY 1 (May 2013), http://www.academia.
edu/3590129/Too_Big_to_Ale_Globalization_and_Consolidation_in_the_Beer_
Industry (noting that four firms account for 70% of the beer revenues, which
resulted from a trend of consolidation through mergers, acquisitions, and
joint ventures).
242. But see Appel, supra note 232.
243. See Daniela Galarza, UPDATE: Beer Brewer Exposes Illegal Pay-toPlay Tap Practice on Twitter, EATER: BEER HERE (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:38 PM),
http://www.eater.com/2014/10/14/6976865/beer-brewer-expose-illegalcommitted-taps-twitter (describing Pretty Things Beer’s frustration with
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Many bars allegedly require breweries to make illegal tap
payments “under the table.” 244 Additionally, by removing the
three-tier system, the alternatives allow large breweries’ coercive
behaviors to further extend from the distributor tier to the retailer
tier. 245 Anheuser-Busch InBev, a large macrobrewery, uses its
voluntary program to incentivize distributors to exclusively
distribute its products.246 Despite the inability to have a financial
interest in a distributor, Anheuser-Busch InBev still succeeded in
pressuring 59% of its distributors to exclusively distribute its beer
in 2008.247 These exclusive-distribution incentives were part of a
larger program that allows distributors to accumulate cashredeemable points for taking certain marketing actions. 248 In
2015, Anheuser-Busch InBev implemented yet another exclusive
distribution incentive program for its 500 distributors with the
goal of doubling distributor participation in the next three
years.249 Large breweries have succeeded with these incentive
tactics 250 despite anti-coercion statutes. 251
Laws further
Boston bars allegedly requiring breweries to buy lines, which is prohibited by
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau).
244. See id. (noting one bar owner’s characterization of the pay-to-play
practice as common with some companies).
245. See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233 (announcing an expansion
of Anheuser-Busch InBev’s incentive program, which includes voluntary
distributor “alignment” through exclusive distribution); see also WHITMAN,
supra note 49, at 3–4 (describing historical tied houses).
246. A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233; see also Mickle, supra note
233.
247. A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233; see also Mickle, supra note
233.
248. Leo Jakobson, The 2013 Grand Motivation Master Winner: AnheuserBusch, INCENTIVE MAG. (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.incentivemag.com//News/
Industry/The-2013-Grand-Motivation-Master-Winner—Anheuser-Busch.
249. Mickle, supra note 233 (noting the goal of doubling participation
from the current 38% participation rate). After the program was
implemented, the president of Deschutes Brewery announced that one of its
distributors had dropped Deschutes’ brands. Id. Fears over Anheuser-Busch
InBev’s influence continues to grow, where as of early 2016, Anheuser-Busch
was awaiting a decision by the United States Justice Department as to
whether it would approve the merger between Anheuser-Busch InBev and
SABMiller (excluding SABMiller’s share of MillerCoors). Thomas Buckley,
SABMiller Buoys Case for AB InBev Takeover as Africa Sales Gain,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 21, 2016, 2:07 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-01-21/sabmiller-beer-shipments-beat-estimates-on-latinamerica-africa.
250. See id.
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regulating these incentive programs would become highly
intrusive, as their success would depend on extensive restrictions
into the corporate affairs of large breweries. Eliminating the
three-tier system would only expand the potential for abuses from
distributors to retailers by allowing direct interactions between
breweries and retailers.252 These concerns are a reality in states
that have completely removed the second-tier requirement, such
as California, where the United States Justice Department, as of
late 2015, is investigating whether Anheuser Busch InBev’s
acquisition of two distributors makes it too difficult for craft
breweries to get their brands on store shelves. 253
In addition to the likely being ineffective, eliminating the
three-tier system is also not politically feasible. 254 The NBWA
advocates for the continued mandatory separation of the three
tiers because the system requires the use of distributors, which
provides business for its constituent companies. 255 Since 1989,
the NBWA has donated over $40 million to political campaigns. 256
A quarter of that money has been contributed at the state
level 257—the level where three-tier systems have been
251. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403(3) (2015); see also MARC E.
SORINI, BEER FRANCHISE LAW SUMMARY 2 (2014), https://www.brewers
association.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Beer-Franchise-Law-Summary.
pdf.
252. Cf. A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233 (detailing the influence
Anheuser-Busch InBev has on distributors through direct relationships).
This influence could expand to retailers if direct relationships are permitted,
as was the case with tied houses in the past. WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–
4.
253. Tripp Mickle, Anheuser Says Regulators Have Questioned Pending
Distributor Buyouts, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2015, 10:09 PM), www.wsj.com/
articles/anheuser-says-regulators-have-questioned-pending-distributorbuyouts-1444702179. Currently, Anheuser-Busch InBev owns seventeen of
its 500 distributors. Id.
254. See Disbursements, supra note 234. In addition to making campaign
contributions, the NBWA has spent a significant amount lobbying the federal
legislative branch since 2012. Id.
255. See What Is a Beer Distributor?, supra note 49.
256. National Beer Wholesalers Assn, SUNLIGHT FOUND.: INFLUENCE
EXPLORER,
http://staging.influenceexplorer.com/organization/national-beerwholesalers-assn/4703da042a7047eba2bdf4850105d6d6?cycle=2010
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150507132328/http://influenceexplorer.com/or
ganization/national-beer-wholesalers-assn/4703da042a7047eba2bdf4850105d
6d6].
257. Id.
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implemented and thus where they could be reformed. With this
amount of influence on policy, eliminating the three-tier system
would be politically difficult.
The alternative remedies would fail to prevent the large
brewery abuses that the three-tier system successfully reduces.
Added to the problem of these alternative remedies’
ineffectiveness, the remedies do not translate well into
legislation 258 and are not politically feasible.
The NBWA
maintains political influence and supports the three-tier
system.259 Because the three-tier system remains the best way to
prevent large brewery abuses, and is politically feasible, the Model
Law retains it but supplements it with other provisions.
2.

The Three-Tier System in the Model Law

To minimize abuses by large breweries, states should retain
the three-tier system.260 The Model Law supplements the system
by prohibiting financial ownership between tiers in order to
prevent manipulation of the regulatory structure. 261 Along these
lines, the Model Law also includes anti-coercion provisions.262
Together, these provisions would sufficiently prevent largebrewery abuses.
The Model Law begins by establishing the three-tier system:
A. Three-Tier System: Malt or brewed beverages are
distributed through a three-tier system. The tiers are
enforced through a licensing system: 263

258. See Appel, supra note 232.
259. See National Beer Wholesalers Assn, supra note 256; What is a Beer
Distributor?, supra note 49.
260. See supra Section III.A.1 (describing the problems with completely
removing the three-tier system, including the potential for large brewery
abuses); see infra Model Law § A.
261. See infra Model Law § B.
262. See infra Model Law § C.
263. Similar language can be found in many enacted statutes. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 3-5-1101(b) (2014) (“Regulation . . . is considered
necessary . . . [t]o promote and maintain a sound, stable, and viable three-tier
system of distribution of beer to the public.”); 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-1.5
(2014) (“[T]he primary purpose of this Act is to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of this State through the sound and careful control and regulation of
the manufacture, distribution, and sale of alcoholic liquor through a 3-tier
regulatory system.”).
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(1) A brewery’s license allows for the production and
manufacture of malt or brewed beverages. The
holder of a brewery’s license may only sell to holders
of a distributor’s license, except as otherwise stated
in this statute.
(2) A distributor’s license allows for the sale or
delivery to retailers of malt and brewed beverages
that the distributor purchased from holders of a
brewery’s license.
(3) A retail license allows for direct sales to
consumers.
These provisions establish the three tiers and regulate
breweries through a licensing system. 264 This basic structure
sufficiently minimizes large brewery abuses because it prevents
direct relationships between powerful breweries and small
retailers, and thereby reduces the potential for a brewery to take
advantage of a retailer.265 For instance, the distinct tiers limit
Anheuser-Busch InBev’s ability to coerce retailers to exclusively
sell its products, as the brewery does with many of its
distributors. 266
In addition to enacting the three-tier system, the Model Law
also prohibits the following financial interests:
B. Prohibition of Financial Interest: 267
264. A full version of a statute based on the Model Law would
differentiate certain brewery licenses for different types of establishments.
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 125.295 (2014) (stating the department should issue
separate brewing permits to brewpubs, allowing them to manufacture and
serve the beer on the premises subject to certain restrictions). For example,
brewpubs operate with a brewery and restaurant, and thus different
restrictions are needed for brewpubs than are needed for a traditional
brewery. See id. (providing specific requirements for packaging, container
size, transportation, and off-site sale).
265. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–4.
266. See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233.
267. Existing state law with similar provisions can be found in section
563.022(14)(a)-(b) of Florida’s Statutes (stating that no brewery “may have an
interest in the license, business, assets, or corporate stock of a licensed
distributor nor shall such entity sell directly to any vendor in this state”) and
in chapter 235, act 5, section 6-4.5(b)-(c) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes
(stating that “no person licensed as a manufacturer of beer . . . shall have any
prohibited ownership interest, directly or indirectly, in a person licensed as a
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(1) No brewery may have a direct or indirect financial
interest in a distributor or a retailer, except as
otherwise provided in this statute.
(2) No distributor of brewed or malt beverages may
have a direct or indirect financial interest in a
brewery or retailer, except as otherwise provided in
this statute.
(3) No retailers of brewed or malt beverages may
have a direct or indirect financial interest in a
brewery or retailer, except as otherwise provided in
this statute.
These prohibitions prevent ownership interests between the
tiers, precluding companies from manipulating the tier system
through self-owned entities in multiple tiers rather than merely
having direct operations at those tiers. 268
Without these
provisions, financial ownership would act as a proxy for operating
outside of the three-tier system.269 These provisions expand the
effectiveness of the three-tier system and minimize large brewery
abuses by reducing large brewery control over distributors and
retailers.
While the three-tier system’s prohibition of ownership
prevents direct influences by large breweries, anti-coercion
provisions are needed to reduce the impact of voluntary incentive
programs that large breweries, such as Anheuser-Busch InBev,
use to facilitate exclusive distribution from distributors. 270 While
such provisions 271 are not sufficient replacements for the tiersystem in preventing abuses by large breweries, they function as
distributor” and that “no person licensed in this State as a distributor . . .
shall have any prohibited ownership interest, directly or indirectly, in a
person licensed as a manufacturer of beer”).
268. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 563.022(14)(a)-(b) (2014) (prohibiting
manufacturers from having an interest in distributors); see also WHITMAN,
supra note 49, at 3–4.
269. Instead of distributing to retailers, large breweries could potentially
buy a distributor and then exclusively distribute through its self-owned
distributor. In this sense, the brewery would effectively operate outside of
the three-tier structure.
270. See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233.
271. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403 (2015) (providing for both the
three-tier system and other anti-coercion provisions).
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an important supplement. The Model Law includes these addition
anti-coercion provisions. 272 Because there is a broad range of
possible anti-coercion provisions, the following provisions are
illustrative rather than exhaustive:
C. Prohibition on Undue Influence and Coercion: 273
A brewery is prohibited from the following:
(1) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, any distributors
to accept delivery of beer not ordered or that was
properly cancelled.
(2) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, any distributor
to perform an illegal act by threatening to amend,
cancel, terminate, or refuse to renew a franchise
agreement.
(3) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, a distributor to
limit its right to sell competing brands of beer unless
sale would materially impair the quality of service.
These provisions add another layer of protection to the threetier system because they target “coercive” behavior by regulating
the actions of breweries towards distributors. 274 These changes
protect distributors’ investments in breweries’ brands. The threetier system’s ownership prohibition between tiers prevents a
brewery from owning or operating as a distributor, but it, of
course, does not prevent direct dealings between two tiers. 275
Consequently, coercion provisions prevent breweries from taking
For example, a
advantage of these direct relationships. 276
provision in the Model Law prohibits a brewery from coercing a
distributor into accepting the delivery of beer that the distributor
did not order. 277 The three-tier system, by itself, could not
272. See infra Model Law § C.
273. Similar existing provisions can be found in subsections (a) and (d) of
section 436.1403(3) of Michigan’s Compiled Laws (prohibiting breweries from
forcing distributors to accept delivery of unordered beer and limiting
distributors’ rights to sell competitive brands).
274. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403(3) (using the word “coerce” to
describe prohibited brewery conduct).
275. See supra Section III.A.
276. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403(3)(a)-(c).
277. See infra Model Law § C(1).
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prevent such abuses.278
These provisions would adequately prevent problematic large
brewery abuses by establishing the three-tier system, preventing
financial ownership between tiers, and prohibiting undue
influence and coercion. 279 The Model Law would prevent tied
houses by establishing the three-tier system and prohibiting
financial ownership between tiers. 280 Through these provisions,
breweries would not be able to directly own retailers.281
Additionally, all three provisions would work to prevent other
coercive behavior outside of the context of tied houses.282 The
anti-coercion provisions, for example, would prevent breweries
from coercing distributors into accepting cancelled orders,
performing illegal acts, and limiting their right to sell competing
brands. The Model Law succeeds where the alternatives fail; the
three-tier system minimizes the potential for abuse by limiting
direct relationships between breweries and retailers.283 Large
breweries, such as Anheuser-Busch InBev, would not have the
same direct relationship with retailers that they rely on for their
successful distributor-incentive programs. 284
Through these
provisions, the Model Law would prevent tied houses and would
reduce other coercive behaviors.
B. Small Brewery Exemptions to the Beer Franchise Laws
States should provide small breweries with exemptions to the
termination and territory protections of beer franchise laws.
These mandated protections do not reflect the current market
conditions, as many states have not substantively updated their
regulations to reflect the craft beer revolution.285 When the beer
franchise laws were enacted, the economic strength of a small
number of large breweries overshadowed the very limited

278. See supra Section III.A.
279. See infra Model Law §§ A-C.
280. But see Appel, supra note 232 (arguing that the three-tier system is
unnecessary to prevent tied houses).
281. See infra Model Law § B.
282. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403 (2015) (applying to non-tiedhouse relationships between breweries and distributors).
283. See infra Model Law § A.
284. See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233.
285. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-3A-6 (2014).
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economic power of many small, family-owned distributors.286
Given the disparity in number and economic strength, breweries
had more choice over which distributors to contract with and
greater influence over franchise negotiations.287 The rationales
for these protections have disappeared since most of them were
enacted.288 By exempting small breweries from the termination
and territory protections, the Model Law improves competition
and returns control to breweries’ hands, 289 while still alleviating
concerns with large brewery opportunism.
1.

The Disappearing Rationale Behind Mandated Protections

Since states implemented termination and territory
protections, the market and legal environments have changed. 290
By not updating these laws as the protections’ rationales
disappeared, states have created an uneven bargaining
environment.291
This uneven bargaining environment has
removed brand control from breweries. 292 The removal of brand
control is especially problematic because breweries cannot often
afford to engage in litigation to remedy conflicts with distributors,
the result being that competition in the market is reduced. 293
As has been discussed above, today’s market differs greatly
from that of the 1970s.294 Approximately ninety-eight percent of
breweries are craft breweries, who, by definition, are small in
size.295 As the number of breweries has shot up from a low of
eighty-nine in 1978, the market power of distributors has

286. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2213.
287. See id. With more economic power and choice over franchisees, large
breweries are able to present take-it-or-leave-it offers. See id.
288. Id. at 2217–18.
289. See infra Sections III.B.1 & III.B.2.
290. Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2202.
291. Id. at 2217–18 (explaining that the relationships between breweries
and distributors have changed and that some “traps for unwary craft
breweries” exist).
292. See Hindy, supra note 117 (stating that states’ laws allow
“distributors to select brands and manage them however they want—selling
those they choose to sell, while letting other brands sit in their warehouses”).
293. See, e.g., id. (recalling when the Brooklyn Brewery was forced to
settle because it could not afford litigation costs).
294. See supra Section II.B.1.
295. Number of Breweries, supra note 25.
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consolidated. 296 The average shipping amount increased by
130,000 barrels during this time period. 297 As distributors’
relative economic strength has grown, the vast majority of
breweries is now small craft breweries lacking comparable
economic clout. 298 Yet, the statutorily mandated protections for
these distributors stayed in place, even with the disappearing
market rationale.299
In addition to the disappearing market rationale, the legal
environment influencing states’ enactment of territory protections
has changed. 300 States enacted the territory protections when the
legality of such grants depended on whether state law mandated
them. 301 Legislators determined that it was better to always have
the exclusive territory grants rather than never have them. 302
Today, exclusive territory grants can be legal even when not
mandated by state law. 303 Consequently, in addition to the
disappearing market rationale, another reason for the mandated
exclusive territory grants—the all-or-nothing legality—no longer
applies in the current legal environment. 304
With the former rationales disappearing, the mandated
296. Id.; see Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2217–18.
297. Watson, supra note 51 (stating that between 1970 and 2014, the
average annual shipments per distributor has increased from 20,000 barrels
to 150,000 barrels).
298. See id. (stating that the “average brewer today looks nothing like the
brewing industry in the 1970s,” that the number of breweries passed 3,000 in
2013—most of which are “tiny”—and that the average brewing amount is less
than 1,000 barrels each year).
299. See id. (“[C]urrent industry dynamics and market power
relationships are markedly different than they were in the past. This
matters, since many beer regulations were crafted in an era when brewers
were big and wholesalers were small.”).
300. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 25 (stating that before 1977,
“[e]xclusive territories were illegal under federal antitrust law unless they
were mandated by state law”).
301. Id. (stating that the Supreme Court held exclusive territories to be
per se illegal and that federal antitrust law made such territories illegal
unless required by state law); see United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
302. See id.
303. Id. (stating that in 1977 the Supreme Court reserved course on on
the per se rule against exclusive territory agreements it had announced a
decade earlier); see Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
304. Id.
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distributor protections cause an uneven bargaining environment
for small breweries.305
Most modern distributors have a
bargaining advantage over craft breweries because of distributors’
statutorily mandated protections and their comparatively greater
natural economic strength. 306
The statutory protections
necessitate the inclusion of highly favorable terms for the
distributors—terms not common in other industries.307 The
franchise agreement’s deck is accordingly stacked against craft
breweries.308 By mandating the protections, the terms are not
part of a larger give-and-take negotiation. To illustrate: if a
brewery desires certain favorable terms, it cannot offer one of the
mandated provisions as a concession because it is already
automatically included. As a result, the brewery may have to
concede some other favorable term. The uneven bargaining
environment results in highly favorable franchise agreements for
distributors. 309
Adding distributors’ economic strength to the bargaining
equation sets craft breweries back further.310 For whatever terms
are left over to negotiate, distributors can often bargain for even
more favorable terms because craft breweries have minimal
distribution options—especially new, small craft breweries. 311
Small breweries have less influence and distribution options
because their comparatively small productions are less valuable
than large breweries’ productions. 312 Additionally, small, new
305. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07; Tamayo, supra note
8, at 2217–18.
306. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07; Tamayo, supra note
8, at 2217–18.
307. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 405.
308. See id. at 402–07; see also Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2217–18.
Instead of using a blank slate to negotiate, the slate often has permanent
etches of territorial protections, transfer protections, termination protections,
damages and procedural protections, and operational protections. Kurtz &
Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07. Even ignoring that many distributors
come to the table with more economic strength than most craft breweries,
craft breweries still automatically begin negotiations at a disadvantaged
point because of the protections. See id.
309. See id. at 402.
310. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2218.
311. See id. at 2233 (arguing that self-distribution allows a small brewery
to show distributors that the brand will be profitable in the market, resulting
in a favorable contract with a signing bonus).
312. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 408. However, this
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craft breweries’ brands lack value because they have not
developed consumer bases and because distributors risk receiving
a smaller return on their requisite investment. 313 Consequently,
the bargaining differential creates a number of issues for craft
breweries.
The bargaining differential often results in a lopsided
franchise agreement that removes brand control from
breweries.314 One brewer recently wrote in a New York Times oped that the termination and exclusive territory protections allow
distributors to choose which brands are distributed and which
brands stay in the warehouse.315 Distributors have this control
because termination protections require breweries to meet a high
good cause standard to terminate an agreement. 316 Even with
good cause, some states still require a brewery to pay termination
damages.317 This control problem is further complicated by
exclusive territory mandates because breweries cannot turn to
other distributors if their brands are being distributed in an
undesirable fashion or, as highlighted by the op-ed, not
distributed at all.318
Small breweries often have difficulty
addressing this disadvantage. 319
disadvantage is not true of the large, macrobreweries, such as AnheuserBusch InBev, who influenced 59% of its distributors to exclusively distribute
its beer in 2008. See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233. Anheuser-Busch
InBev is able to use its economic strength to exert control over the operations
of distributors. See id.
313. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232. Distributors are partially
responsible for the promotion of a brand. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 12.
With new brands that have not developed a consumer base, distributors have
to make more investments in advertisement. Id. This investment is an extra
cost added to the risk of trying to sell a brand that does not have regular
customers. See id.
314. See Hindy, supra note 117.
315. Id.
316. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 405 (comparing beer
franchise laws with franchise laws of other industries to conclude that
similar good-cause requirements are generally not mandated).
317. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 23-1110 (2015) (stating that in the event that
a franchise agreement is terminated or not renewed by a brewery, the
distributor is entitled to “reasonable compensation for the laid-in cost to the
distributor of the inventory of the supplier’s products”).
318. See Hindy, supra note 117.
319. See id. (recounting how Brooklyn Brewery had to settle rather than
continue with a lawsuit challenging the franchise agreements because it did
not have adequate litigation funds).
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As a result of craft breweries’ inherently small size, they often
lack the funds to challenge distributors in lawsuits.320 The
brewer who penned the above-referenced op-ed also recollects the
legal difficulty that his brewery faced: when attempting to
terminate a contract that provided his brewery could leave “with
or without cause,” his distributor challenged the provision as
inconsistent with the statutorily mandated protections.321 The
brewery settled out of concern about further legal costs. 322 Even
though the brewery settled out of court, it was still left with
$300,000 in legal fees.323 Craft breweries, being economically
smaller than macrobreweries and most distributors, often cannot
afford to litigate disputes with distributors.324
The “double markup” effect inflates this problem, reducing
small breweries’ competitiveness in the market. 325 Both the
distributor and the retailer “mark up” the price. 326 While the
brewery might charge $8.00 for a six-pack of beer, the consumer
may end up paying $10.00 for the same pack. This problem
impacts
small
craft
breweries
more
than
it
does
macrobreweries.327 Macrobreweries are often able to lower their
prices because of economies of scale.328 Production benefits are
associated with large-scale production, which reduces

320. Id. (“[M]any small breweries lack even a fraction of the resources
needed to take on a big distributor in court.”).
321. Id.
322. See id.
323. Id. One brewery even turned to crowdfunding to assist with legal
costs. Sue TABC: Operation Six Pack to
Go!!, INDIEGOGO,
https://www.indiegogo. com/projects/sue-tabc-operation-six-pack-to-go#/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2016) (raising $34,852 to sue the Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Commission to allow the on-site sale of beer for off-premise consumption, but
failing to reach its $100,000 goal).
324. By definition, craft breweries produce small amounts of beer. See
Craft Brewer Defined, supra note 25. Being small in size, craft breweries do
not benefit from an economy of scale reducing their production costs per beer.
See Elzinga, supra note 3, at 97–98. Smaller production and comparatively
high production costs often result in less money being available for litigation.
See Hindy, supra note 117.
325. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9–10 (identifying the “double
markup” effect as an impediment to competition within the beer industry).
326. See id.
327. See Elzinga, supra note 3, at 97–98 (describing how large breweries
are better able to control production costs than are smaller breweries).
328. Id.
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macrobreweries’ costs per beer.329 The resulting increase in craft
beer prices makes craft breweries less competitive than they
might otherwise be. 330 The small brewery exemptions in the
Model Law would restore competition to the market.
2. Small Brewery Exemptions from Territory and Termination
Protections
The Model Law exempts small breweries from the territory
and termination protections. 331 Because the rationales behind
these protections no longer apply, the Model Law improves
competition by creating exemptions.
The small-brewery
exemptions reduce the double markup effect, return some control
to breweries, and retain protections against macrobrewery
opportunism.
Exemptions for small breweries, when correctly done, improve
competition in the market. 332 If exclusive territory grants and
termination protections are no longer mandated by statute,
distributors compete to sell a certain brand to retailers in a
particular region. 333 This regional competition minimizes the
double markup effect: distributors would not have the same
latitude to increase the price of beer as it passes to the third tier
because distributors would be competing for sales. 334 If the
distributor increases the price too much, the retailers could buy

329. Id. at 95.
330. An opponent might respond that consumers may be willing to pay a
premium for craft beer. But with the rise of large breweries’ imitations of
craft beers, consumers may be confused about which brands are actually craft
beer. See Craft vs. Crafty, supra note 37. This confusion results in
competition between craft breweries, who are impacted by relatively high
costs, and large breweries’ imitation craft beer, which is not so impacted. Id.
The competition puts craft breweries at a disadvantage. See WHITMAN, supra
note 49, at 9. Additionally, the increased cost may deter new customers who
are not interested in paying a premium to experiment with a new brand.
331. See infra Model Law §§ D-E.
332. Cf. Scott, supra note 62, at 426–29 (discussing how North Carolina’s
beer distribution regulations fail to promote competition).
333. See id. (arguing that exclusive territory grants allow for a distributor
monopoly to develop, effectively eliminating competition at both the brewery–
distributor level and the brewery–retailer level).
334. See id. at 426–27 (reasoning that when products are substitutes,
there will be competition between distributors).
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the brand from another distributor.335 Small brewery exemptions
force distributors to compete with other regional distributors,
reducing the double markup effect and improving competition.
With lower overall prices for consumers, this change would
increase sales and increase distributors’ overall profits as a
result. 336
Opponents of eliminating mandated protections argue that
competition between two brands of beer is sufficient competition
for the market. 337 However, when two brands of beer are not
“substitutes” for each other, the law does not promote the same
level of competition.338 Two brands are “substitutes” when a
consumer would easily substitute one for the other.339 Prices
increase when two distributors are not competing for
customers.340
Additionally, the elimination of the mandates alleviates some
breweries’ concerns that distributors with exclusive territories
have the power to decide which brands are distributed and which
brands are not distributed. 341 In a non-exclusive distribution
region, a brewery may turn to a different distributor if one
distributor inadequately distributes a brand.342 The removal of
the mandate returns some product control to breweries. 343
Because these exemptions return some control to breweries,
335. See also id. at 431 (stating the current mandates and three-tier
systems have created a lack of evidence that any growth has occurred in
North Carolina’s brewing industry and have resulted in a price increase of
18% to 25%).
336. See id. at 431 (discussing how the three-tier system creates
artificially high prices).
337. See id. (explaining that the current laws cause “artificial price
increases” that benefit large breweries and harm small craft breweries,
whose beer is generally already more expensive).
338. See Scott, supra note 62, at 427 (noting that Natty Greene’s beer is
not a substitute for Miller Lite, which means that their respective
distributors will not compete with each other for customers).
339. Id. (suggesting that “Miller Lite and Bud Light may be substitute
products”).
340. Id. at 426–27 (providing an example where one distributor carries
Bud Light and another carries Miller Lite, which causes them to compete for
the business of retailers).
341. Cf. Hindy, supra note 117 (reciting the problems faced by Brooklyn
Brewing when a distributor failed to meet the breweries’ expectations
because of the lack of brand control for the brewery).
342. Cf. id.
343. Cf. id.
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opponents express concern about brewery opportunism.344
However, by creating these exemptions, terms currently mandated
by law are not necessarily excluded, but become part of a larger
“give-and-take” negotiation between the brewery and distributor.
Consequently, distributors concerned about specific brewery
opportunism can still bargain for the formally mandated
protections. If a distributor wants an exclusive territory grant,
then it may have to agree to an additional term beneficial to the
brewery. These exemptions create a more even bargaining
environment for franchise negotiations and correct the problems
caused by the mandates, but still allow for distributors to bargain
for protection against brewery opportunism. The Model Law
includes the following provisions exempting small breweries:
D. Termination Mandate: 345
(1) An independently-owned 346 brewery that
produces less than [amount] barrels of beer and
whose sales constitute [amount] percent or less of the
distributor’s total annual brand sales may terminate
or not renew any agreement with a distributor with
or without having good cause for such termination or
nonrenewal. In all other circumstances, a brewery
may terminate only with good cause as contractually
defined between the parties.
344. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 10–11 (stating that a brewery might
“appropriate” value by terminating a contract and transferring—or
threatening to—the network established to a different distributor that is
willing to accept “less-desirable terms”).
345. This provision is loosely based on language from New York’s current
beer statute. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c) (McKinney 2014). A
somewhat similar provision can be found in Nevada’s statutes. See NEV. REV.
STAT. § 597.160(2) (2014) (exempting breweries that produce under 2,500
barrels per year from its termination protection provision).
346. The definitional section of the statute would define an independent
brewery similar to how the Brewers Association does: An independent
brewery is one where three-quarters or more of the brewery is owned or
controlled by entities that meet the production exemption set by the Alcohol
Board. This definition would eliminate a large brewery end-run of the
exemption’s production limitations through purchasing craft breweries.
States would also have the option to measure production cumulatively of all
entities involved in the ownership structure if, depending on the particular
market involved, there is a likelihood of abuse of the exemption through
small-brewery conglomeration.
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(2) Any brewery meeting the good-cause exemption in
subsection (1) is not subject to liability provided that
the brewery provides [amount] days’ notice and prior
to the termination, pays the distributor the fair
market value of the distribution rights that will be
lost or diminished by the termination.
(3) Disputes are subject to arbitration.
E. Territorial Protection:347 A brewery shall grant
each of its distributors an exclusive sales territory. This
subsection does not apply to an independently-owned
brewery that sells less than [amount] barrels of beer or
malted beverages annually.
H. Agency Authority: 348
(1) The Alcohol Board shall formulate the
qualifications for exemptions from the termination
and territorial protections as set out in sections D
and E.
Under the termination mandate exemption, the Model Law
exempts breweries that produce less than a certain number of
barrels of beer and that constitute less than a certain amount of a
distributor’s sales. This section also includes a limitation based
on the amount the brewery constitutes of the distributor’s total
sales because this amount indicates the brewery’s level of control
in its relationship with the distributor. The more a brewery
represents of the total sales, the more influence the brewery has
in the distribution relationship because of the distributor’s heavy
reliance on those sales. In the event of conflict, the Model Law
mandates arbitration to prevent expensive litigation. 349 The
347. Existing state law with somewhat similar provisions can be found in
section 12-47-406.3(8) of Colorado’s Revised Statutes, which exempts craft
breweries completely from franchise mandates.
348. Some states have vested rulemaking authority in state alcohol
agencies. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25750 (West Supp. 2015) (“The
department shall make and prescribe those reasonable rules as may be
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes and intent of [California’s
constitutional amendment concerning alcohol beverage control]” and this
statute).
349. For a real-life example of such expensive litigation, see Hindy, supra
note 117.
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territorial protections exemption focuses only on the production
levels because the exemption works to reduce the double markup
By focusing on
effect through distributor competition.350
production levels, the exemption limit is a proxy for the breweries’
economic strength and reduces the chance of brewery
opportunism.351 The Model Law provides state agencies with the
authority to set the specific parameters of the small brewery
exemptions.352 Agencies have the expertise necessary to develop
appropriate limitations and grace periods based on the particular
needs of their states. An agency will determine this by examining
what best serves the underlying purposes of the exemptions. 353
Unless there is a specific market issue in a particular state,
there is no need to exempt small breweries from the transfer
protections and the operational protections.
The transfer
protections are viewed with less hostility because the terms of the
contract remain intact following such a transfer. 354
The
operational protections for non-discrimination provisions should
remain mandatory, as is typical in franchise law. 355 Its rationale
lies in preventing litigation,356 which still applies in the modern
beer market. 357 As a result, the exemptions should focus on the
territory and termination protections.
To account for the changes in the market, small breweries
should be exempted from the territory and termination
protections. This change creates a more level bargaining field by
returning some control to small breweries. The changes also
350. See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9–10.
351. See id. at 10–11.
352. See infra Model Law § H(1).
353. Determining the specific exemption will require agencies to look at
the bargaining differential between distributors and breweries in that state
and provide an exemption to the point where breweries’ and distributors’
economic power is fairly balanced.
354. See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 404 (noting that transfer
protections are “less contentious” because the franchisor still receives
royalties and generally only the remaining terms are transferred, allowing
breweries to reevaluate the distributor relationship at renewal).
355. See ROSENFIELD, supra note 145, § 57, at 68.
356. See id. (stating that operational protections against discrimination
are necessary to keep “Pandora’s box to litigation” closed).
357. See, e.g., Thom Vogelhuber, Dogfish Head v Glunz; No Settlement in
Sight, GUYS DRINKING BEER (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.guysdrinking
beer.com/glunz-v-dogfish-head-no-settlement-in-sight.
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improve competition and reduce the double markup effect. These
exemptions benefit the market, but should be supplemented by
changes to laws limiting self-distribution and direct-sale changes.
C. Self-Distribution and Direct-Sale Exemptions
Self-distribution and direct-sale laws should provide more
liberal exemptions for craft breweries. The same changes should
be made to both types of laws because both present the same
problem: small breweries frequently cannot find a distributor to
distribute their beer because their brands initially lack value.358
Small breweries are unable to self-remedy this problem because
many states’ laws prohibit or strictly limit direct-sale to
consumers 359 and self-distribution to retailers. 360 Exemptions for
small breweries would allow those breweries to build brand value,
making their beer more attractive to distributors.
Liberal
exemptions would benefit consumers, breweries, and distributors
alike. 361
Consumers’ ability to purchase certain beer brands is
constrained because of limits on self-distribution and directsale. 362 The distributor bears significant investment costs and
risks not receiving its expected return on investment because new
breweries lack consumer and retailer bases—a problem
compounded by the minimal exposure received through
advertising.363 Consumers cannot purchase a brewery’s beer

358. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–33.
359. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-213(2) (2015) (allowing direct sale
only in the form of samples to be consumed on a brewery’s premises).
360. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 512B, 512C (West Supp. 2014)
(allowing brewpubs and microbreweries to sell beer directly to customers on
their licensed premises, but mandating that distribution off-premises be
handled by wholesalers).
361. Consumers benefit through better variety and lower prices. See
Chen, supra note 10, at 541. Breweries benefit by building brand value. See
Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2235. Distributors benefit by knowing ahead of
time which brands are likely to be successful. See id. Additionally, when
breweries negotiate contracts on a balanced field, breweries will still most
often distribute through a distributor because distributors are often able to
operate more efficiently than could a brewery by itself. See WHITMAN, supra
note 49, at 23.
362. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232 (discussing how “small and
unknown brewers often find it difficult to access distribution networks”).
363. See id. at 2235.
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when no distributor will distribute it and when the brewery is
unable to directly sell to consumers or self-distribute to
retailers.364 Self-distribution and direct-sale allowances create a
legal route to market and reduce instances of black-market sales.
Even amidst lobbying opposition from distributors, some
states have exempted craft breweries from the limitations on selfdistribution 365 and direct sales 366—albeit not without
problems. 367 These exemptions allow breweries to develop brand
value, making brands more attractive to distributors. 368
However, these exemptions present a new problem: when a craft
brewery no longer qualifies for the exemption, 369 the brewery
must choose between pursuing growth and limiting production to
continue self-distribution and direct-sale.370 If the brewery
continues to grow and surpasses the exemption limit, then the
brewery can no longer self-distribute or directly sell. If a brewery
values self-distribution and direct-sale more than it does growth
or does not have a network developed, then the brewery must halt
its production and limit its growth. 371 This dilemma must be
carefully considered by state legislatures or agencies determining
the appropriate cut-off point.
The Model Law is drafted to mitigate this issue. A grace
period remedies the problem a brewery faces when forced to halt
growth to develop a distribution network. 372 Under a statute
including a grace period, once the brewery crosses the exemption
limitation, it has a certain amount of time to end its selfdistribution and direct selling, and to establish franchise
agreements with distributors. This window is necessary to allow a

364. See Chen, supra note 10, at 541–42.
365. See, e.g., 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(a) (2014).
366. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 28-A, § 1355-A(2)(D) (2014).
367. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 512B(a), 512C(a).
368. See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–35. A brewery is able to build
brand value by building a customer base. See id.
369. For example, a brewery reaches the exemption limit once it reaches
the production point (or whatever measure the state law uses) set by the
state agency.
370. See Scott, supra note 62, at 428 (discussing the difficulties of small
breweries slightly over exemption limit).
371. Or, a brewery might be forced to rush franchise negotiations with
distributors, resulting in unfavorable terms.
372. See infra Model Law § G.
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brewery time to react to sudden business changes—changes likely
in a quickly growing and volatile craft beer market. 373 A brewery
may experience rapid growth, 374 or it may be faced with
unexpected closure.375 The amount of time needed to develop a
distribution network is unpredictable. 376 Forcing a brewery to
invest in developing a distribution network too early could hamper
The grace period alleviates breweries’
its development. 377
concerns about rushing distribution network establishment.
These proposals are supported by empirical data. States with
self-distribution exemptions for smaller breweries have
experienced a statistically significant increase in the number of
craft breweries per capita and an increase in production. 378 These
changes have improved the market in many states that have
implemented them.379 Exemptions help to promote variety and
competition in the market. 380
The Model Law provides the following self-distribution and
direct-sale exemptions:
F. Self-Distribution and Direct-Sale Exemptions:
Any brewery meeting the qualifications specified by the
373. See Thierry Godard, The Economics of Craft Beer, SMARTASSET (Aug.
12, 2015), https://smartasset.com/insights/the-economics-of-craft-beer.
374. See Daniel Fromson, Idea of the Week: Mapping the Rise of Craft
Beer, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/idea-of-the-week-mapping-the-rise-of-craft-beer
(identifying
two
breweries—Blackstone Brewery and Karbach Brewing—that grew by over
1,100% between 2011 and 2012).
375. See Bart Watson, Closings Signal Competition, Not Problems,
BREWERS ASS’N (Sep. 25, 2014), https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/
closings-signal-competition-not-problems.
376. See Godard, supra note 373 (quoting one brewer who warned that
although distributors are interested in selling craft beer, “there are too many
craft breweries for the distribution channel to handle effectively,” and that
breweries are subjected to the “question of whether [distributors] have room
in their portfolio”).
377. See Candice Moon, Top 10 Legal Mistakes Made by Craft Breweries,
CRAFT BREWING BUS. (Sep. 9, 2014), http://www.craftbrewingbusiness.com/
business-marketing/top-10-legal-mistakes-made-craft-breweries.
378. See generally MISS. BREWERS GUILD PROJECT, LEGISLATION REVIEW,
BENCHMARKING, AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY (2014); see also Dr. Statelaws,
supra note 157 (explaining that states with self-distribution have 1.41 craft
breweries per 100,000 people over the age of 21, while states without have
.77).
379. See, e.g., id. at 13.
380. See Dr. Statelaws, supra note 157.
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Alcohol Board may act as a distributor and/or directly sell
beer of its own production to consumers.381
G. Grace Period: When a brewery no longer meets the
qualification, the brewery is entitled to a grace period, to
either requalify or end its self-distribution and directsale. The Alcohol Board shall formulate the grace period.
H. Agency Authority:
(2) The Alcohol Board shall formulate the
qualifications for the self-distribution and direct-sale
exemptions set out in section F. The Alcohol Board
shall also formulate the grace period set out in
section G. 382
These provisions exempt any small brewery that meets the
qualifications propounded by the state alcohol agency. Once a
brewery outgrows these qualifications, it receives a grace period to
develop a distribution network or slow its production and
maintain the right to self-distribute and directly sell to
consumers. The specific qualifications are determined by the state
agency focusing on alcohol regulation, as prescribed in the Model
Law. 383
The qualifications for the exemption should focus on the point
when breweries are able to build enough brand value where
distribution presents a normal amount of risk for the
distributor.384 The qualification could likely be established with
data collected through an economic survey. The factors might
include what the market considers an acceptable risk and return,
coupled with historical data on when craft breweries have
381. Similar provisions can be found in section 04.11.130(b)(2) of the
Alaska Statutes (allowing all breweries to self-distribute) and in chapter 235,
section 5/5-1(a) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes (allowing breweries
producing up to 930,000 gallons annually to self-distribute).
382. Similar language in an existing statute used for a different purpose
can be found in section 25750(a) of the California Business and Professions
Code.
383. See infra Model Law § H(2).
384. As a result, the exemption qualification for self-distribution, directsale and the beer franchise laws would not necessarily be the same amount.
There may be a point where a brewery has built enough brand value to
attract distributors, but has not yet developed enough economic strength to
effectively bargain with distributors.
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typically succeeded in forming franchise agreements. The latter
factor might look at the number of customers and the amount of
advertising the brand has received. In addition, determining the
length of the grace period would likely involve analyzing the
average time it takes to convert from self-distribution and directsale to establishing a distribution network through independent
distributors.
It might be argued that instead of exemptions, craft breweries
should merely have their own regulatory regime under which they
apply for a separate license.
However, these exemptions
constitute a small portion of the overall beer regulations. An
entirely new system just for small breweries would be duplicative
and would lead to interpretative confusion. Non-lawyer brewers
are the audience for these statutes—individuals often without the
resources to hire an attorney.385 A debate over intended and
unintended differences between the statutes would create
confusion about the interpretation of the statutes. Using the
exemption system reduces duplication of laws and the potential
for confusion.
The direct-sale and self-distribution exemptions benefit
breweries, distributors, and consumers. Breweries that lack the
size and value to contract successfully with distributors have an
alternative method of distribution. The exemptions also benefit
distributors because the exemptions allow breweries to build and
prove their brand’s value, minimizing the risk posed to
distributors by outlaying resources on fledgling breweries of
uncertain value. Consumers benefit because they have access to a
greater variety of beer at lower prices. The Model Law’s
exemptions promote variety and competition in the market.
CONCLUSION

Current regulations stifle competition and reduce variety in
the beer market. The three-tier system should be retained to
prevent abuses by large breweries. However, because craft
breweries’ brands often lack value, state laws should provide selfdistribution and direct-sale exemptions for craft breweries. At the
same time, state laws should also provide craft breweries with
385. See Moon, supra note 377 (discussing the need for counsel to assist
breweries navigate their legal environments).
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exemptions from the statutorily mandated protections to balance
the bargaining relationship. There is a growing need for these
changes to benefit both breweries and distributors, but the
changes require both sides to come to the table and compromise.
As the president of the Brewers Association recently remarked,
“[t]here’s beer at the table. Why aren’t we both sitting around
that table?” 386

386. Charlie Papazian, Beer Franchise Law Reform, BREWERS ASS’N (May
28, 2014), https://www.brewersassociation.org/news/beer-franchise-law-re
form.
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APPENDIX: THE MODEL LAW

A. Three-Tier System: Malt or brewed beverages are
distributed through a three-tier system.
The tiers are
enforced through a licensing system:
(1) A brewery’s license allows for the production and
manufacture of malt or brewed beverages. The holder
of a brewery’s license may only sell to holders of a
distributor’s license, except as otherwise stated in
this statute.
(2) A distributor’s license allows for the sale or
delivery to retailers of malt and brewed beverages
that the distributor purchased from holders of a
brewery’s license.
(3) A retail license allows for direct sales to
consumers.
B. Prohibition of Financial Interest:
(1) No brewery may have a direct or indirect financial
interest in a distributor or a retailer, except as
otherwise provided in this statute.
(2) No distributor of brewed or malt beverages may
have a direct or indirect financial interest in a
brewery or retailer, except as otherwise provided in
this statute.
(3) No retailers of brewed or malt beverages may
have a direct or indirect financial interest in a
brewery or retailer, except as otherwise provided in
this statute.
C. Prohibition on Undue Influence and Coercion: A
brewery is prohibited from the following:
(1) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, any distributors
to accept delivery of beer not ordered or that was
properly cancelled.
(2) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, any distributor
to perform an illegal act by threatening to amend,
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cancel, terminate, or refuse to renew a franchise
agreement.
(3) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, a distributor to
limit its right to sell competing brands of beer unless
sale would materially impair the quality of service.

D. Termination Mandate:
(1) An independently-owned brewery that produces
less than [amount] barrels of beer and whose sales
constitute [amount] percent or less of the
distributor’s total annual brand sales may terminate
or not renew any agreement with a distributor with
or without having good cause for such termination or
nonrenewal. In all other circumstances, a brewery
may terminate only with good cause as contractually
defined between the parties.
(2) Any brewery meeting the good-cause exemption in
subsection (1) is not subject to liability provided that
the brewery provides [amount] days’ notice and prior
to the termination, pays the distributor the fair
market value of the distribution rights that will be
lost or diminished by the termination.
(3) Disputes are subject to arbitration.
E. Territorial Protection: A brewery shall grant each of its
distributors an exclusive sales territory. This subsection does
not apply to an independently-owned brewery that sells less
than [amount] barrels of beer or malted beverages annually.
F. Self-Distribution and Direct-Sale Exemptions: Any
brewery meeting the qualifications specified by the Alcohol
Board may act as a distributor and/or directly sell beer of its
own production to consumers.
G. Grace Period: When a brewery no longer meets the
qualification, the brewery is entitled to a grace period, to
either requalify or end its self-distribution and direct-sale.
The Alcohol Board shall formulate the grace period.
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H. Agency Authority:
(1) The Alcohol Board shall formulate the
qualifications for exemptions from the termination
and territorial protections as set out in sections D
and E.
(2) The Alcohol Board shall formulate the
qualifications for the self-distribution and direct-sale
exemptions set out in section F. The Alcohol Board
shall also formulate the grace period set out in
section G.

